POLÍTICA NUCLEAR
national plutonium and spent fuel management schemes which are
at least in part already foreseen in the Agency's statute. 8uch
schemes couId suppIement international undertakings of a more
industrial nature in an essential fashion.
In considering the future, it seems unavoidable to recognize the
stricter coupling which will be required between assurances of sup–
pIy and assurances against proliferation. The promotional and safe–
guards functions will be more closely joined. In this sense it wouId
be unrealistic to
try
to turn the dock back to the situation prevail–
ing in the late 1960s and early 19705. It must, however, be hoped
that in the search for a new international regime which will give the
presentIy desired added assurances, we do not discard the institut–
ions which exist and the undeniable achievements which have been
made. One possible direction. was indicated in a recent paper
given by Deputy Undersecretary
J.
Nye of the U. 8. Department
of State:
HA stable internationaI regime should build upon and reinforce
the previous accomplishments of the atoms for peace programme,
the
lAEA
and the
iNlPT.
Even
ir
aIl new institutions are not under
the jurisdiction of the
IAEA,
they should be consistent with it, and
help to reinforce the safeguards system that has separated peaceful
and military uses of nuclear energy in the pasto The
IAEA
should
be envisaged as the center of the institucional system"l
lPaper
given at the Uranium Institute, London, July 12, 1978.
154
