R. Skjoldebralld
I
MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: !AEA AND OTHER.••
logy basis is in many countries such that major programmes can
be launched with a considerable participation of the domestic in–
dustry. Even in fuIl recognition that most of this technology trans–
fer, especially as related to hardware, will be sought through bilate–
ral agreements, we can safely assume that increasing demands also
will be placed on
IAEA'S
assistance and advisory services. At this ti–
me it seems, however, that the possibilities and conditions for
technology transfer are one of the major uncertainties.
The history of the last 30 years has clearly demonstrated that
even the most strenuous efforts at control will not prevent the slow
but steady spread of the technology needed to produce highly enri–
ched uránium or to separate plutonium. Enrichment technoIogy
has always been regarded as highly secret while reprocessing techno–
logy to separate plutonium has been in the open literature since
the first Geneva Conference. Still about the same number of
countries, if not more, now have established domestic enrichment
technology as compared to those who have established reprocessing
technology. There can be little prospect that the future wiIl show
us a way of creating technoIogical or legal barriers against dissemi–
nation of industrial technologies and their usefulness would seem
doubtful in the light of past experience. What is, however, neces–
sary now is to strengthen the existing international rramework
aiming at the non proliferation of nuclear weapons. One way to
pursue, besides strengthening safegnards, could be through multí–
national fuel cycle facilities.
Certainly, the world would get added assurances
if
the product–
ion of enriched uranium and plutonium were concentrated in as
few localities as possible and were preferably undertaken in large,
truly commercial plants operated under multinational auspices.
It
is also in the common intemational interest that políticaI uncertain–
ties that have beset the suppIy of nuclear fuel, particular1y enriched
fuel, could be diminished. These are some of the questions which
the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation
(INFCE)
is now considering.
INFCE
is an intemationaI study, launched in 1977 upon the
initiative of
USA
with the basic objective to evaluate how nuclear
power for peaceful purposes can be made widely available while
still minimizing the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons.
There are now 53 states and 5 intemational organizations which
