Assembly aregrossly overworked and, in conseqlience, several human
rightS instruments 'are languishing in them, without a chance oí com-
pletion.
.
Toremedythis, it is suggested that the functions of both the
Commission and the Committee be split aIl!d assigned to separate ho.
dies. The Commission on Human Rights might become the equivalent
in the human rights fieId of ·the International ·Law ComffiÍssion and
would devote itself soleIy to the codification and development of the
international law of human rights. Another Commission would t,ake
over the non-drafting functions of the present Commission: the dis.
cussion of special situations and of communications, the preparation
and evaluabon of special studies, and the supervision of various other
United Nations activities in the human rights .field. Similarly, the
Third Committee might become exdusively a· Committee on Human
Rights, whiJe a Special Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee,
analogous to the Special PolíticaJ Committee might be established.
Alternatively, the Third Committee might continue to exercise its
man)' functions, with the exception of its human rights tasks, which
couId be transferred to an intersessional Committee on Human Rights,
similar to the newIy revived Disarmament Cornmission.· Final1y, to
increase the international visibility of United Nations efforts in the
field of human rights, a periodic special session of the General Assem.
bly might be inserted into the current cyde of sessions on economÍc
matters and disarmament, thus creating a staggered three.year system
of speciaI sessions.
In
due course, a separate consultative Assembly
00
Human Rights might be established, which could play an invigorating
role in the human eights field as important as that of the Consulta.
tive Assembly of the Council ofEurope.
As the multiplicity of internation'al human rights instruments of
universal character has created a possibility of conflicts between them
(in addition to likely conflicts with regional instruments), it is sug–
gested that the General Assembly should adopt an interpretative ins.
trument, embodying a "most.favorable.to.the.individual" clause, which
\Vould make it ciear tha.t in any particular case, an individual is entí.
tled to benefit from that one of the conflicting instruments which
gives him better protection against interference with his rights.
The United Nations has developed three principal procedures
foe
implementing its human rights instruments: periodic reports, ínter.
State complaints and communications by indivíduals or private non_
governrnental organizations (NGO's).·
The reporting system is the most comprehensive one, and by now
there are several, to sorne extent ovedapping, procedures. Most
Members of the United Natíons present reports on various aspects
of human fights to the Commíssion on Human Rights pursuant to a
system instituted by the Economic and Social Council in the 195(1'5.
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