POLÍTICA NUCLEAR
approval for export of highly enriched uranium. Generally the
Administration also followed a policy of making no new commit–
ments for the sale of nucler technology or fuel to countries which
refuse to forego nuclear explosives, refuse to refrain from national
reprocessing or refuse to place their nuclear facilities under
IAEA
safeguards. These polices, applied prior
lO
the passage of the Non·
Proliferation Act of 1978, were generally supportive of that bill
which however went quite a bit further as will be subsequently
explained.
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS.-
The Administration also undertook a
number of international measures, both bilateral and multilateral
in nature. The compelling motive behind these initiatives was
concern regarding the widespread utilization of plutonium and a
belief that existing non·proliferation efforts were not proving suf–
ficient. On the bilateral leve! a considerable e(fort was undertaken
to convince other supplier nations to adhere
lO USo
views that certain
sensitive technologies should not be exported induding reprocess·
ing and enrichment facilities. Considerable success was achieved
particularly with the agreement of France and Federal Republic
of Germany to avoid future exportation of reprocessing facilities.
Certain pending arrangements for the sale of such equipment
were reversed (France with Pakistan) and existing arrangements
tightened (Germany with Brazil) in part due
lO
us pressure. How·
ever, European nations and Japan made dear their intent
lO
pro·
ceed with reprocessing and plutonium recycling and agressive de–
veloping of breeder technology despite the apparent shíft in the us
programo
On the multilateral level the Administratíon gave strong sup'
port to the 15 nation London Nuclear Supplier Talks which re·
ached an agreement on a broad set of guidelínes in late 1977 as
to the transfer and sale of nuclear equipment and materials. The
efforts of the nuclear supplier nations and tIle resulting guidelines
represent an attempt to introduce a degree of stability and certain·
ty among all nations -producers and consumers- as to what and
how nuclear transactions will take place. The central portion oE
the guidelines is the agreement that, prior to exporting sensitive
equipment, importing nations must agree to provide assurances
that imported material will not be used for nuclear explosives,
202
