Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

POLITICAL AÑD ECONOMIC STRATEGY When he took office, Allende promised that he would lollow a "second model" 01 Marxism-the vía chilena to socialism, "with meat pies and red wine." To .prove that this model was "anticipated by the classics 01 Marxism," he quoted Irom Friedrich Engels on the possibility 01 ...a peaceful evolutionfrom the old society to the new in countries where the represent;tíves of/he people have allpowerand in accordwith the consti/u/ion can do what (hey desire when they have the majority ofthe nation behind them.(2) . Vet it was preciselythe question 01 majority support that was Allende's central problem in his design to carry out a peacelul transition to "socialism with democracy, pluralism and liberty," The parties in his coalition were in a distint minority in the Congress, and althQugh there was no doubt about the legitimacy 01 his election by that body, his victory had only been possible because 01 the conditional support 01 the Christian Oemocrats, The POC, it should be noted, included both Radomiro Tomic, the party's 1970 presidential candidate, who had gone to Allende's house to congratulate him the day after the popular election, clearly inferring his luture support, and conservatives like Senator Juan de Dios Carmona, who had lought withín the party to prevent it Irom voting lor Allende in the run-off, In the immediate aftermath 01 the election the POC 'was controlled by the Tomic lorces, who claimed to be in lavor 01 "communitarian" socialism, nationalization 01 copper, accelera– tíon 01 agrarian relorm, and reduction 01 Chi le's dependencia on the United States, One way, then, lor Allende to achieve his acknowledged go&1 01 majority support lor the transition to socialism would have been totry to arrive at an understanding with the Christian Oemocrats on the points in his program with which they wer.e in agreement. This might have provoked the secession 01 some 01 the rightist members 01 the POC, but il an accord had been reached with the party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende a majority in the Congress lor at least part 01 his programo .' Flushed with victory and unwilling to come'to terms with the party which he had termed "the new lace 01 reaction" during thecampaign, Allende chose an alternative strategy, The next congressional elections were not scheduled to take place until March 1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in the event 01 a conll ict with the Congress over the text 01 a constitutional amendment, the President could'call a national plebiscite. The strategic course adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popular support lor his coalition and then propose a constitutional amendment which, ·in accordance with the Popular Unity electoral program, would replace the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral house, to be elected immediately lollowing the approval 01 the amendment. The Congress would be certain to rejectthe amendment, but il Allende hao the support 01 a majority in the . 'country, he could win the plebiscite and secure control 01 the unicameral legislature that would then be established. Allende's strategy lor the expqnsion 01 electoral support was an economíc one which drew as much Irom John Maynard Keynes as il did IromKarl Marx. The Chilean economy, already operating below capacity, had gone into a prolound .recession as a result 01 Allende's election. The response 01 Pedro Vuskovic, Allende's Minisler 01 Economics, was to "prime the pump" by adopting a delicit budget, increasing public expenditures, and redistributing income by skewing the annual wage readjustmenl lor the preceding year's inllation (35 percent in 1970) in lavor 01 the low-income sector 01 the population (the lowest income groups received a 40 percent increase). The utilization 01 unused industrial capa– city, combined with strict enlorcement 01 price control s, more stringent collection 01 taxes, and refusal to devalue the Chilean escudo in relation to the dollar, were expected to contain (2)EI Mercurio (Santiago), Nov. 6, 1970. p. 23. 22