Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

ALLENDE IN RET~OSPECT(*) By PAUL E. SIGMUND World attention has moved away from Santiago si nce the bloody overthrow of Salvador Allende last Septe'mber, butthe questions that were raised at thattime still need answering. Where should the primary responsibility be placed for the tragic events on and after September 11, 1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a fascist counterrevolution aided and abetted by the forces of imperialism? Was it: as the Right asserts, the only available rí'lsponse to Allende's attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a mixture of guile and force? Oid it mark the "death of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by democratic means, and was it thereby one more demonstration that Marxism must use force to accomplish its goals? Were there internal and externaI political and economic factors which made it impossible for Allende's experiment to succeed, orwas the downfall of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) coalition government the consequence of a series of ideologically-influenced analyses and mistaken policy choices which, if they had been different, might have produced another result? A review of the course of the Allende government with the aid of the considerable new material that has become available in recent months may help to answer these questions. Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote in a three~way race.(1) What they do not mention is that in the congressiónal run-off between the two front-running candidates he was elected presielent by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. He received the support of the centrist Christian Democratic Party (POC) in the run-off in return for his agreement to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of Oemocratic Guarantees protecting freedoms of expression, education and religion, and guaranteei'ng the independence of the military from politital control. The text of the statute, which was added to the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allende's election, reflected the fears of non-Marxist groups that the new Marxist President would use the considerable power of the Chilean executive to undercut and eventually destroy al! opposition to a Marxist takeover. (*)Published in Problems o[ Communism, May-June 1974. Reprinted with the permission given jn the'general editorial policy 01 Problems 01 Communism. (1 )Allende's supporters in the ?opular Unity coalilion consisted 01 hjs own Socialist Party (Partido Socia– lista-PS), the Communist Party'(Parlido Comunista-PC), the majn body oflhe Radical Party (Partido Radical-PR), Ihe leftist Catholic "Movement 01 Popular United Action" (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unido-MAPU), and two other smaller groups. The largest oppositlon groups were the centrist Christian .Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano- PDC) and the righlist National Party (Partido Nacional-PN). . In retrospect, I1 is ironic that the Chilean Senate never acted on a constitulional amendment proposed early In 1970 to establish a second-round popular election, which would have provided the President thus elected (probably the righ\-wing candidate. Jorge Alessandri) with a clear popular mandate. 21