Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

groups like the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) that change could be brought about on Iy through armed violence, and the Chri stian Democratic party leaders did not wish to see the country inflicted with urban guerrilla terrorism like Uruguay or Argen– tina.(5) In spite of all this the Christian Democrats never considered voting for Allende uncon– ditionally. A majority of the partywas in fact openly suspicious of the Marxist dominated Unidad Popular coalition and insisted upon a series of constitutional amendments guaran– teeing that Chile's polítical democracy would be respected. Although these guarantees were little more than explícit affirmations of what was-already basically guaranteed by the Chilean Constitutíon, the Allende forces at first balked at giving them. But the Christian Democrats made it plain that they would not vote for Allende untíl a constitutional amend– ment guaranteeing basic democratíc freedoms was passed in Congress.(6) Realizing that they had IiUle choice, the Unidad Popular forces in Congress reluctantly voted, along with the Christian -Democrats, to accept the constitutional guarantees and soon afterward Allende became President of Chile.(7) THE POLlTICAL-ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF THE UNIDAD POPULAR The essence of the Un idad Popular program was the promise to create a socialist state through peaceful and demócratic means, the só-called "vía pacífica y democrática hacia el socialismo" ("the peaceful and democralic road to socialísm").(8) The economy was to be divided into three sectors or areas. The first was to be a "dominanfpublic sector, composed of firms already owned by Ihe stale and also by lirms... (to be) expropriated." Thesecond was an area of private property, and the thírd a "mixed sector" that was lO include businesses where state and prívate capital were combined.(9) The fundamental socio– economíc and political changes necessary to achieve the goal of a Socialisl state were lo be accomplished largely within Chile's Iradilional, legal-conslilulional framework. Allende's advisors had done a careful Sludy of Chíle's legal and constilutional syslem, Ihe conclusion otwhich had been Ihal most of the fundamental changes desired by the Unidad Popular government could be accomplíshed through the use of 'Iegíslalion already in exislence, For example, in terms of agrarían reform, Ihe 19671aw passed during Frei's term was sufficlently broad and strong to enable the Unidad Popular to carry out its plan for speeding up expropriations. In addition, while seldom violating the letter of the law, the Unidad Popular did oflen violale ils spiril by taking advantage of legal ambíguities, technicalities, and loopholes in circumventing majoríty opposition from Ihe Congress to many of its actions. To illustrate, because of legal ambiguíties in its charter, the Stale Development Corporation (CORFO) was used to buy up shares of bank stocks on Ihe open market when it appeared that the legislation need to nationalize the ban.ks would not pass Congress.(1 O).F:inally, onlythe nationalízation of copper needed significanl new legíslation (5)These reasons were outlined in personal intervij'lws in Santiago. Chile, with Bernardo Leighton, April 24, 1973; Jaime Castillo, April 9. 1973; Patricio Aylwin, July 17, 1973; and Radgmiro Tomic, July 28, 1973. (6)For more details on the "Constitutional Guarantees," see La Segunda, October 23, 1970, , p. 8; Ercilla, October 7,1970, pp, 10-11; and Olavarría, Chile Bf.lio la Democracia Cristiana, Vol. VI, pp. 297-305. The Constitutio– nal Guarantees were aimed at making more explicit the guarantees 01 a free press, the right 01 political organization (Le., partíes), a neutral armed forces, and an independent educational system freeof ideological indoctrination. See, Chile, Constitución, capítulo 111. (7)Allende was voted into the Presidency by the Congress on October 24, 1970 and took office on November 3, 1970. . (8)Allende's complele program can be found in Política y Espíritu, August, 1970, pp. 48-56. See also Joan E. Garcés Salvador Allende: Nuestro Camino al Socialismo: La Vía Chilena (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Papiro.' 1971 l, pp. 151.158. In addilion 10 the program of the Unidad Popular, this lalter work contains the "40 Mea,$ures 01 the Popular Government" and "The 20 Points 01 Agrarian Reform." (9)Salvador Allende, Chile', Road ro Socialism, ed. by Richard Golt (Great Brilain: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 37-39. (1 O)One lefl-wing source described the lactics ofthe Unidad Popular in laking over industries and businesses as "imaginativa". See, Elizabeth Farnsworth, and olhers, New Chile, North American Congress on Chile (California: 164