Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

A POLITICAL ANO ECONOMIC OVERVIEW OF THE POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT(*) By EDWARD GLAB, Jr. After Allende's victory was announced during the early morning hours of the day following the election, wlldly celebrating Allende and Tomic supporters embraced and danced down Santiago's main streets asthough a common candidate had won. For his part, the day after the election Tomic went over to Allende's home to abrazar (embrace) and congratulate him upon being elected President of Chile.(1) In fact, however, Allende's first place plurality did not automatically entitle him to the presidency. According tothe Chilean constitution if no candidate receives more than 50 percent plus one of the total valid votes cast, a jbint session of Congress elects the President by a simple majority vote from among the two candidates who finished first and second in the election.(2) By precedent. the Congress had traditionally voted for the candidate receiving the highest plurality, but this was the first time that a Marxist candidate had finished in first place and pressure began to mount from many segments forthe Congress to vote Jorge Alessandri instead into office. In an attempt to maneuver around Allende's first place finish, Alessandri wrote an open letter to the Congress saying that if he were chosen President, he would resign immediately. This would have cleared the way for new electioris in which Freí would have been eligible to run in a repeat of the 1964 formula, thereby making certain the Marxist coalition's defeat. .However, this was never a viable strategy for a number of reasons.(3) First. Allende threatened massive general strikes throughout Chi le, violence, and even civil war if the victory were taken away from him by a vote of Congress.(4) Second, the Christian Democrats, who held the balance of votes in Congress between the right and left blocks, never seriously considered voting for Alessandri even though it was discussed among some party members as a possible alternative. Third, the majority of the Christian Democrats believed that it was morally and constitutionally incorrect notto vote for Allende given the Congressional precedent of empowering the candidate who had received the first place plurality. Fourth, support of Alessandri in Congress would have been impossible for the Christian Democrats to justify after the left-wing campaign Tomic had conducted. Finally,the Christian Democrats did not want to make a martyr out of Allende by denying him the Presidency. Such a move would have giVf~n strenqth to the argument advanced by (")The research lorthis article was made possible by a generous grant Irom the Fulbright-Hays Commission that enabled the authorto spend 12 months in Chile between September, 1972and August, 1973. The authorwould liketo thank Dr. Roderick Groves and Prolessor William P. Glade, Jr. lor reading over the manuscript 01 this artícle and making suggestíons. However, the author assumes sale responsibilily lar al! statements and conclusions as well as any errors in lact or interpretation included in this article. (I)Radomiro Tomic. interview in Santiago, Chile. July 28.1973. See also Richard E. Feinber, The Triumph of Allende (New York: New American Library, Inc" 1972). (2)Chíle, Constitución, capítulo V, arto 64. Allende, beat Alessandri in the general election by only 39.175 votes out 01 a total cast al almost three million. See Chile. Dirección del Registro Electoral. Variación Porcentual de los Partidos Políticos, 1957·1971. . (3)Ernesto Pinto Lagarrigue in an interview in Santiago, Chile. July 2, 1973 told me that Alessandri later regrelted ever naving wrilten that lelter. (4)Arturo Olavarría Bravo. Chile Btlio la Democracia Cristiana. Vol. VI (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Salesiana, 1971), pp. 278-279. See also El Mercurio. September 14,1970, p. 24. 163