Desarrollo de la Antártica

Brian Roberts I INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR ANTARCTIC ••• different attitude. On this occasion 1 do not want to discuss the basis upon which exclusive sovereignty has been c1aimed over certain sec– torso Let us accept that these c1aims exist and I!hat the Treaty has gone a long way towards 'freezing' these old disputes and toward5 substituting peaceful international co·operation. The point 1 want to emphasize now is that we are very rapidIy being overtaken by events. The rest of the world wiTI not wait while the Treaty governments procrastinate. The tweIve original s:gm.tories all acting together -still less any one of them acting alone- will no longer be able to maike effective dedsions about the peacefui deve– lopment of the Antarctic without steadily growing opposition. It seems to me quite essential t'hat the Antarctic Treaty governments give a clear demonstration that they are capable of dealing with Antarctic probIems. The obvious need is foy agreement on one of two alternatives: either a complete moratorium on all economic exploitation (within a defined area) , or a regime within which mineral exploitation would be availa:bIe to any state operating under licence, whether 00: not they are a party to the Antarctic Treaty. The fir,t of these seems to me wholIy unrealistic in a world urgently seeking new sources of raw materials. \Certainly the longer it is postponed, this problem will become increasingly difficult tO' solve. It is generally thought that tihe second alternative presupposes that the over-riding issue oE territorial jurisdiction must first ha've been settled. But is thii second supposition realIy vital? It is not impossible to envisage a situation in which the Antarctic Treaty Consultative ¡Parties continue tO' reserve aH their c1aims to jurisdiction, but at the same time agree not to raise the question of resource ownership. They couId set up a joint licencing authority and establish a special regime with tilie necessary stipuIations for protecting t'he environment, financial arrangements fm licences, etc. In this connection r have oEten thought that it might be best for the United Kingdom to look upon itself as a non-claimant state, in all but name. In the long run, claimant states might well beneHt most by heIping to create a regime enabling them tO' have non-dis. criminatory access under licence to the minerals oE the whole area. Might this not be preferable to c1aiming exclusive ownership of mi– nerals in a sector W:here exploitation can never be practical wit'hout international agreement. No natiO'll can contemplate unilateral ac– tion unIess they are prepared to defend their operations -- if necessa– ry 'by force. Tihis probabIy means no exploitation, hut it would not 343