Desarrollo energético en América Latina y la economía mundial

DESARROLLO ENERGÉTICO EN AMÉRICA LATINA y LA ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL overvalued exchange rate*. By about 1975 it became clear to the Peruvian gobernment and the international banking community that the country was badly overextended. Several abrupt stabilization pro– grams occured during 1976 and 1977. By 1978 Peru was being kept from bankrupcy by 45.90 day debt "rolIover!>" by private banks, restric· tions had become very severe, and the civil disruptions since that time have been well recorded. Brazilian attempts to grow at "miracle" rates of 10·11 % proved to be sustainable only with heavy infusions of new capital. Borrowing the latter only becomes sustainable if exports expand rapidly and imports can be held somewhat in check. By 1972.73 Brazil showed a balance of payments surplus (on officíal settlements basis) despite a current account deficit, because of large inflows of foreign capital. Reserves climbed steadily because of new borrowing, and these acted as "backup" for new loans (Smith 1979). The potential increase in the money supply due to new reserves was only partIy "sterilized" during 1973. By 1974 however, excess demand created by the expanding money supply burst forth, leading to a surge of import demand and a dete– rIoratíon in Brazils' balance of payments. Thus, while oíl imports increased by $ 2,247 million between 1973 and 74, largely due to oil price incl'eases, total impol'ts expanded by $ 7,169 million. The petroleum pl'ice hikes of that yeal' certainly compounded Brazil's ba· lance of payments problem but was by no means decisíve. In Smith's (1979: 306) words "The importance of Petroleum in Bl'azil's current predicament is easily exaggerated". Prelíminary analy8es indicate that Brazil's problems of 1976-77 may have been temporary; in 1978 growth in GDP and exports were both up (CEPAL, 1979) though not to the earlier miracle rates. Panama is one of the most oil dependent countries in the group. As a proportion of total imports oil ranged between 33% in 1974 and 30% in 1977. The country has borl'owed somewhat in an attempt to cover it's oil deficit but does not seem to have done so aggressively. Debt service increased only slightly between 1973 and 1977**. Ex– ports have not grown, and in real purchasing power, declined sligh– tly 1973-77. As one would expect when an increased balance of payments deficit is neither financed in the 8hort run, nor closed by -The Sol was pegged at 38.7 $ 1 through 1974. Thereafter it devalued ra· pidly to 196 = ti 1 by 1978. (IMF, 1979). uFrom aoout 17% of exports to 19%. 230