Desarrollo energético en América Latina y la economía mundial

William Loe/¡r I POST 1973 ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS OF OIL-IMPORTINC... same rate (exports: 20_9%; imports: 20.2%, unweighted yearly ave– rages) since 1972, despite the Iarge import jump in 1974 due to oil price increase.s. Since 1975, exports have expanded by 12.8% per year, and imports by only 5.3%. Unfortunately, there are several coun· tries that have not fared well. Peru, Chile and Panama have been singled out as poor performers on reserve management, growth and export performance. Brazil has shown some signs of a weakening position. They merit closel' attention. The problems of Chile and Peru predate the "energy crisis". Chile ended 1973, basically bankrupt. Public debt service couId not be maintained requil'ing a major debt "rescheduling" at that time. In. flation was running at over 300% per year despite the GDP reductions that had taken place in 1972 and 1973*. The large borrowings and recessionary conditions characterizing almost the entire 1974-77 period are well known to be assocÍated with the public austerity pro– gram oE those years. These conditions probably would have occured in any event no matter what happened to petroleum prices. Peru's difficulties were also evident before oil price increases in late 1973. Large public investment programs began in about 1970. Unfortunately, tax revenues lagged far behind expenditures, and pu– bIic enterprises produced financial losses rather than the profits pro– jected. Thus, by 1972 Peru was forced to borrow heavily, and turned to private foreing banks to cover the fiscal deficit. Private international banks willingly entered Peru since oil had been discovered there in 1971, and projections oí a new "Saudi Arabia" were being offered. In a way one migth say that Peru was mortgaged on the basis oí petroleum reserves, which never materiaHzed. By 1974 the current account deficit was rllnning at about 40% of exports, but this deficit was masked by; capital inflows which were large enough to turn an overall balance of payments surplus (on an offidal settlements basis) . This was compounded by very poor export performance *,.. and vastIy 6Ironical1y Chile may have been helped by the OPEC activities oí late 1973. Many raw materials purchasers anticipated that other "OPEcs" wouId be formed among raw materials exporting countries. Thus, in the rush to stockpile before prites rose, raw materials prices were bid up lo record high leve1s. Copper prices rose so much that Chile's merchandise balance was positive in 1974 despite oil increases. (Boletín, Banco Central de Chile) . •• As a percentage of CDP, exports of 1974 were only 50% of 1964 levels. 229