Desarrollo energético en América Latina y la economía mundial

William Loehr I POST 1973 ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS OF OIL-IMPORTING.•_ reduced net reserves to about zero if reserves were to be relied upon for adjustment. Some of Peru's problems do not show up in table 2. At the end of 1973, Peru's reserves were at a relatively high level lor that country. Part of this reserve build up had come from increased borrowing. Thus, Peru's ability to finance oi! cost increases out of reserves depended upon a situation which may have been temporary. Reserves couId have been expected to fal! even without the energy pricc increase, and increased debt service would reduce net reserves even further. There had already been a large jump in Peru's debt service payments between 1972 and 1973·. El Salvador and Honduras meanwhile held reserves which were not the result of heavy borrowing. Thus, of the three countries in group 2, Peru's position was probably most precarious. Group 3 is composed of five countries whose holding 01 reserves were inadequate to meet 1974 debt service, let alone contribute to adjustment required by the energy crisis. In addition aH countries in this group. with the exception of Costa Rica, have among the highest rations of petroleum imports to total imports found in Latin America. Thus, Costa Rica had the best possibility of leaving group 8. The others were faced with the need to expand borrowing very fast, or $uffer the consequences of economic contractions. In an attempt to evaluate how countries have fared since 1973, and to judge them on terms similar to those used in table 2, we have constructed table 3 which contains similar data for 1977. The net reserve import relationship in coIum E is of spedal interest, because it tells us something about each country's 1977 ability to withstand disturbances to the balance of payments similar to those occuring in 1973.74. A higher percentage indicates greater ability to handle such disequílibrium. Eight countries have improved their net reserves to import rela– tionship and all but three have decreased the ratio of oH imports to total imports. Paraguay, Honduras, El Salvador and Gua'temala seem to have been most successful in building reserves despite high petro– leum costo In Paraguay's case reserves have been built up and the proportion of petroleum has been reduced from 18% to 9%. Uruguay too has improved its reserve posidon, but as we will see below this has not been without costs. Argentina has greatly improved her reserve position but then she began with adequate reserves and a fairIy low eFrom 15.8% of Exporta to 29.6%. 22~