Desarrollo energético en América Latina y la economía mundial

DJ;:SARROLLO ENERGÉTICO ll.N AMÉRICA LATINA y LA ECONOMíA MUNDIAL This dassification system must only be taken as a rough aproxi. mation of relative degree of difficulty that countries were likely to have had adjusting to 1974 oil related probIems. The increase in petro– leum import cost 1973-74 (colum F) is simpIy the difference in the im– port expenditures in each year. ClearIy some change in petroleum im– ports wouId have occured in any event since as countries grow their petroleum imports increase as well. Thus, Colum F overstates the increase in petroleum costs due to increased prices. Also, while we have made our classification on the basis of net reserves relative to increased petroleum imports, (Colum 1) we do not mean to imply that use of reserves is the way in which extra petroleum expense will actualIy be covered. Export expansion an lor loans surely could be used to meet the extra expense. But these factors vary widely across countries and thus we have used colum 1 to indicate how adequately countries could have borne the increased energy costs on the assumption that nothing else changed. In group 1, Guatemala held high reserves relative to her imports (Colum E) and total imports contained a fairIy Iow proportion of petroIeum. (Columns G; H). The Dominican Republic began 1974 with relatively low reserves, but was the only country where petroleum imports declined. These two countries were probabIy in the best position in oil-importing Latin America to withstand the oil price increase. Argentina and Nicaragua began 1974 with relatively low net reserves (Col. E) but since in both cases petroleum imports were not large relative to total imports, reserves should have been adequate for adjustment. Brazil presents a unique problem among group 1 countries. The country's petroleum imports were 23% of the total in 1974, but since she entered 1974 with immense reserves, adjustment should not have been overly difficuIt. However, given the extreme}y hígh reserves and the heavy dependence upon imported oH, Brazil was in a most uncon– fortable positíon. Reduction in reserves to more "normal" Ievels or further oiI price rises coud easily create for Brazil a situation which wouId be very difficult to manage. Of the countries in group 1 there– lore, Brazil was under the most pressure to obtain longer.run finan– cing, expand exports and to cut down upon the proportion of petro– leum imports. In group 2, Honduras and Peru each have oH imports as a pro– portion of total imports, higher than any countries in Group 1 except Biazil. In both cases, the increased oil import burden would have 222