Desarrollo energético en América Latina y la economía mundial

DESARROLLO ENERCtTlCO EN AMÉRICA LATINA y LA EcONOMÍA MUNDIAL loping nations to have commonly held tanker fleets, if not techno– logy, exploration, refining and integrated industry. We can certainly expect common action in marketing, and that common action will start at final demand and move backwards through joint provision oí some services, and wilI finally lead to an integrated industry. We can also expect that common market agreements will be extended increasingly to the rest of the energy sector, despite the interdepen– dence this imposes. The result would be regionalization oí economic interests, because transport costs will be too high for a more diverse worId trade. Developing nations will be sometimes divided between producer and consumer nations, and sometimes together in blocks bargaining over terms of access to markets and high technology goods, and technology itself. In the long run, the Latin American unification sought by Bolivar may be imposed by OPEe; c) Shifting markets for energy have had a striking impact opon world monetary structure; they have given the coup de grace to the dollar as a reserve currency, and have damaged dollar based economies of developing nations. This, in turn, is causing a move towards a world central bank, with money issued (SDRS andjor substitution accounts) by the bank, although the policy made may not necessarily be that of the International Monetary Fund Staff, so that shifting markets for energy may cause the adoption of earlier Keynes or Triffin plans. Similarly, the recyeling of petrodollars is leading to a more integrated world economy. These developments are consequences of international policy problems resulting from oi! development, but are not central to the analysis of international energy policies. On balance, OPEe may impose greater developing nation and Latin American cooperation and rationality. On the other hand, if, with bad luck, modern incarnations oC Anthony Eden or General Pershing come to power, it couId force a political denousment that would make the "Crash of 79" seem modest in comparison. 126