POLÍTICA NUCLEAR
direction. It is widely known that sorne in the Argentine foreign
rninistry and in certain branches of the rnilitary service favor such
cooperatíon. Of ínterest is the fact that the initial unfortullate
atternpts by the
us
to pressure Brazil relatíve to the vVest Gerrnan
contract stirnulated, at least temporarily, strong expressions of Ar–
gentíne support and suggestions (frorn several levels) for substant–
ive nuclear cooperation.
The Brazilian leadershíp has understandably but unfortunately
becorne highly sensitive and suspidous about any foreign discussion
of their nuclear políey. They are particularly sensitive and suspidous
of proposals for cooperatíon (as llave been discovered by sorne well
meaning
us
politidans) and generalIy wish to proceed quickly to
develop their own domestic nuclear prograrn first. However the
Brazilians are not, in my opinion, unaware of the possible adv3nt–
ages to sorne forro of nuclear understanding with Argentina. Alead
editorial in one of Brazil's leading papers at the end of 1977 pero
haps surnmed
it
up best when
it
said: "A condliatory solution to
the River Plate Basin issue will open doors for a profound pro–
gram of cooperation between Argentina and Brazil -including in
the question of atomic energy".
"\Vhile the
us
and other nuclear supplier nations must be partí–
cularly aware of the acute sensitivity surrounding this issue they
can give private eneouragement to:
a. bilateral agreements for exchanges of scientists and other off·
idals from the nuclear energy commissions leading eventually
perhaps to a complete and mutual opening of alI nuclear facilities.
b. A bilateral system of inspection of nuclear facilities (perhaps
with the assistance of the
lAEA
or eventualIy
OPANAL).
e. An Argentine·Brazilian agreement prohibiting the detonatíon of
any nuclear explosive device (such an arrangement may be far
more feasible as soon as the
us
and the Soviet Uníon aehieve a
comprehensive test ban agreement (which Argentina and Brazil
could be encouraged to adhere to sirnultaneously).
4. The
us
should reconsider its current policy and express a
willingness to support transler 01 sensitive nuclear technology to
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other Latin American nat'ions within
the context 01 the development 01 a luture regional nuclear energy
center under secure international or regional salegua1'ds.
1
will
