POLíTICA NUCLEAR
site surveillance and containment measures to verify the reported
presence of nuclear materials.
The Safeguards Development Subdivision cardes out extensive
research and development programs on:
safeguards application;
developing optimum verification strategies for facilities
under inspection;
improved techniques for the automatic and continuous coll–
ection of information on the identiñcation, containment and
flow of nuclear material; and
automatic processing of information obtained through ins–
pections and provided by sta tes.
Although the technical verification measures applied by the
IAEA
cannot prevent clandestine diversion of safeguarded nuclear
material to military or explosive purpo,ses, they can inhibit a state
from such action by posing a high risk of detection. (The
IAEA
aims for a 95'% probability of detection and correct measurement) .
In the event of unauthorised diversion of nuclear materials the
IAEA
Statute provides that international sanctions may be applied.
Article
'XII
of the
IAEA
Statute provides, inter alia, that when there
is non-compliance with any provision of a safeguards agreement
with the Agency, and the state concerned fails to remedy this non–
compliance:
this shall be reported by the Board of Governors to the
Agency members and to the United Nations S::curity Council
and General Assembly;
assistance provided by the
IAEA
or by its members may be
curtailed or suspended;
the recipient member may be asked to return the materials;
and
membership of the non-complying state in the Agency may
be suspended.
If
it is judged by the
lAEA
Board of Governors that diversion has
ocurred, the United Nations Security Council can then take the
