América Latina: ¿clase media de las naciones?

Independenee of Angola (UNITA), tIme seems to be little aoubt that Cuban support for MPLA was deeisive in tilting the balance, though there were additional faetors which he1ped to MPLA. Among these additional factors was the support that South Africa temporarily gave to Agostinho Neto's enemies. UNITA's flirtation with South Africa especiaHy was disasterous for the movement from the point of view of its standing in Afrkan cirdes. While many African states had previousIy been ready to push for a coalition government to rule Angola ·after the departure of the Portuguese, many of these same governments .later dedded to give moral support to MPLA in reaetion against UNITA's fljrtation with South Afríea. It l'emains to be seen jf Cuban troops would be used either in Zimbabwe or in Namibi:a. It must not he forgotten that there was no Cuban army to help the Iiberation of Angola for as long as the Por. tuguese were stíll in ocupation. MPLA fought the Portuguese for two deeades without getting the active support of Cuban troops and wi. thout an adequate snpply of advanced heavy weaponry from the So– viet Union. lt was only after the Portuguese left Angola in november 1975 - and the war had become primarily one among Africans them. se!ves - that the Cubans were suddenly avail:able for AngoIa's libe. ration, and the Soviet Union was atlast willing to suppIy war planes Bnd heavy artillery. The condusion is irresístable neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba wanted to fight the Portuguese colonialÍsts and risk confron. tation with the North AtIantk Treaty Organization. Have the Soviet UnlOn and Cuba now acquired enough confiden~ ce to move ,directJ;y lnto Namibia and he1p SWAPO throw out apar theid and Sout1: Africa 's domination? Again, there is still no adequate evidence that Russian and Cuban liberators are prepared to risk such á direct ('onfrontation with South Africa. Are they once again waiting untiL ~'the natives" begin to fight ea<:h other before moving in with an ;army to help one of the factions? Wbat about Zimbabwe? Will Cubans and Russians move in to help the Patriotic Front? The prospects for Soviet.Cuban support against Smith in Zimbabwe are slightly brighter than prospects for such support being available :against Botha in Namibia, let alone in South Africa itself. But on balance there seems little doubt that the Russians and Cubans would. prefer to wait until the war is directly a conflict between blacks themselves in Zimbabwe before they go to the extent .of providing war planes to one of the f:actions or impor. ting an additional army to back their favourites. Once again, while not denying the impressive difference Cuba has made to prospects for liberation in Southern Africa, the timing of the Cuban intervention in Angola r.aises questions about the extent (jf Casfro's commitment to African liberation. In Ethiopia it raises 6,- América Latina:.•• 81