Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

when we consider the work of the Chilean branch of LASO, and, of course, in my own country. It was precisely in Chile where Premier Castro corroborated the materialization of that armed support to armed struggle. Speaking to university students in Antofagasta in No– vember 1971, while on his tour of índoctrination through my country, he explained how Cuba armed itself: (Text supplied by the Oficina de Información y Radiodifusión de la Presidencia de la República de Ch¡le, t:ollected on November 23, 1971 by the Chilean extremist magazine Punto Final.) "Bullets arrived, we bought them some mortar shells and first bullets and then the guns started arriving. To say the truth, WE THEN SENT THEM TO ALGERIA, AND WE EXPECT THATTHEY MAY HAVE BEEN OF SOME USE, AT LEAST THOSE BULLETS. AFTERWARDS THERE WAS NEED TO HELP OTHER PEOPLES... " It cannot be denied, Mr. Chairman and Messrs. Representatives, that Castro's Cuba was in more than sufficient condition to arm guerrillas and subversive groups in the hemisphere. At the indicated November 1971 opportunity, Castro admitted: "We began to receive socialíst arms. First from Czechoslovakia and then Soviet weapons. We began to receive tanks, all ki nds of artillery, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, all kínds of rifles, millions of bullets. Well, it seems to me that since the 'Le Coubre' explosion to the present time WELL. OVER ONE THOUSAND SHIPS CARRYING ARMS MUST HAVE ARRIVED IN MY COUNTRY. WELL OVER ONE THOUSAND SHIPS... " Consequent with hís method that "action is one of the most effective instruments for making ideas succeed with the masses", Castro communism gave structure to the LASO decisíons with various mechanisms: 1. Expanding the functions and activities ofCuban secret agents through the offices of "Prensa Latina", the Cuban news agency, legally installed in almost all the capítals of the hemisphere even after the agreement was taken to suspend relations in 1964. 2. Directly sending guerrilla-fighters, ínstructors, and provocateurs to the various Latín American countries. 3. Establishment in París of a Traíning School for Latin Amerícan Youth Leaders, where they were traíned ín subversion, urban guerrilla warfare, sabotage, espionage, and polítical control techníques, under the guidance of the KGB, the Soviet secret poliee. 4. Establishment of a LASO branch ín an OAS member state to permít direct contaet with the southern tier, considered "propítíous" in 1967 for the sowing of the Castro commu– níst armed revolution. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, Chile was the country selected. I have índicated four roads, Mr. Chairman, four ways in which to prepare for revolutíon in the entire hemisphere and to make its outburst "unavoidable". That was the Program of AcUon that the delegates from Argentina, Brazil, Bol ivia, Chíle, Colombía, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Mexico carried back to their respective countries after the LASO delibera– tions concluded in August 1967. "Prensa Latina". The poliee and diplomatic archives of almost all the OAS member states contain records of the activities carried out by the "Prensa Latina" offices in support of subversion and local revolutionary movements. The United States House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security conducted a special investigation on this matter. Its findíngs provide overwhelming evidenee on the responsibility of that up-to-date espíonage and infiltration agency in illegal aets committed throughout the hemis~here. In my country, the local agency of "Prensa Latina" was used as the meeting place of the LASO agents and its teletypes received eoded instruetions, messages, and orders for use in the country as well as in other nations of the southern tier. Members of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria found temporary refuge in the Santiago offices of "Prensa Latina" 89