Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

01 devastating the lishing resources, as it did happen, but also 01 carrying out oceanogra– phic research on a large scale, was permitted the use 01 a two hundred mile zone, with all the consequences that this situation had in t~rms 01 exploration and exploitation 01 marine mineral resources and in the lield 01 naval strategy. The accusations direcied against the construction 01 a por! in Colcura, with aims that were not clearly explained, was another piece 01 evidence which came to demonstrate the growing Soviet hegemony in Chilean waters.(3) AII 01 this is· furthermore incompatible with the mechanisms 01 the South Pacilic System, the declarations 01 Montevideo and Lima and the policies which the govérnment set lorth in the United Nations negotiations. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE Finally, it must also be pointed out thatthe previdus government, by means 01 new legal loopholes, proceeded to create a Ministry parallel to the Foreign Relations Mínistry -the SEREX-which progressively was attributed more responsibility in the lormation 01 interna– tional policíes, principally in the economic sector. In this way, the career diplomatic service with íts prolessiqnal experience was excluded and it was replaced by mediocre Marxist officials who were welcomed with succelent remunerations in dollars in the new parallel service. Furthermore, most 01 this new officials were destined to countries in the Socialist block.(4) IV CONCLUSIONS: THE HONOR AND SECURITY OF THE STATE Chile's international policies require a serious, realistic and woi'lhy presentation. It would be possible to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with all the countries 01 the world, whatever their ideology migbt be, and at the same time protect the national interest; however, this demands independent criteria, technical capacity and non submis– sive attitudes. It is possible to practice ideological pluralism and not make 01 it a 1001 lor híding unilateral intentions orlor anihílating representative democracy. Bythe same token, it became indispensable to clean up economic and political vices which were rendering Chile's international position impotent and seriously damaging her security. Chile's destiny in Latin America and in the Pacilic region, which opens unlorseeable opportunities lor the luture, needed a completelynew outlook lor its international policíes (its internal and external elements) in order to translorm them into instruments 01 national unity and 01 external projection which would be able to achieve for Chile the position 01 respect that she deserves, The results 01 the Popular Unity's policies did not guarantee nor protect the honor or security 01 the State. To a large extent this situation explains why the mflitary 'decided to intervene. (3)See the documented inter\lention on this point in the Chilean Senate by Pedro Ibáñez, published in El Mercurio 01 Santiago, May 17,1973, and lhe article "Chile en la Estrategia Militar Mundial de Hoy" by retired General and Ex-Minister of Defense Tulio Marambio M, in the same paper with date February 27, 1973, (4)See the speech by Ex-Senator Narciso Irureta in the Senate, published in El Mercurio 01 Santiago on July 2 1973, 83