Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

would have been sullicient to have remained neutral to this conllict. In this way, Bolivia obtained a lirst class argument lor destroying Chile's traditional polícy. The second aspect stemmed Irom the typical twisted attitude 01 the Popular Unity leaders who were responsi– ble lor international polícy. It has Irequently been argued, and even some press versions have stated that this would be a position adopted by the Foreign Ministry, that Chile could not satisfy the Bolivian a'spirations because it required Peru's approval. Even il the actual Treaty stipulate this, Chile's motivation is not th.e approval 01 Peru: it is simply the lact that the Bolivian aspirations are unacceptable to the concept 01 Chi lean sovereignty and territo– rial integrity, without it being necessary to ask lor Peruvian consen!. In not emphasízing Chile's right to her territorial integrity, and seeking out secondary and devious arguments, Ihe country was put in a positión 01 extreme weakness, the same as having to beg lorgiveness lor not satisfying the Bolivian claims since it didn't depend sOlely upon Chile. RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA The course 01 relations with Argentina was complex. The Popular Unity government was able to develop good relations with the government 01 General Lanusse, not because there existed any ideological allinity, but rather because il was to the latter's advanlage lo showa pluralist image lor his own internal electoral purposes, and in spíte 01 encounters such as the case 01 exile granted to the guerrillas Irom Rawson, eme 01 whom returned secretly to Argentina Irom Cuba and murdered Admiral Hermes Quijada. At the same time the Popular Unity could reler to these relations as an example 01 the breaking down 01 ideological lrontiers. The scheme changed with the election 01 Cámpora and the return 01 Perón to the Presidency upon the resignation 01 the lormer. Even though Cámpora's briel days in the Presidency began with a touch 01 leftist demagogy, guaranteed by the signature 01 the Presidents 01 Chile and Cuba in the act 01 the assuming 01 office, it is a known lact that Peronism had no sympathy lor tv1arxism and even less lor Chile. In spite 01 thís, the Popular Unity took part in the parody, wíth the pres~nce 01 an elaborated representation which included numerous delegates who had been prevíously characterized by their aggressive anti-Peronist leelíngs and who apparently were now travelling on a pilgrimage 01 repen– tence. The Peroníst government has set down as an objective the translormatíon 01 Argentina into a competitor 01 Brazil as it historically always was. To reach this end, the political mastermínds -such as Jorge Antonio- announced the purpose 01 promoting a populist regime in Latín America which were in agreement with Peronism, mentioning Chile among other countries. By doing so, the aspiration is to create a circle where Brazil could not penetrate, but Argentina would do so. The concrete result is that Argentina, as in the past, will develop an interventionist polícy, necessary lor its internatíonal political goals and also to create the indispensable internal unity around a nationalist scheme. The lirst country destined to receive the effects 01 this policy was Chile, since Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay already had governments capable 01 entering into negotiations with Argentina, aboye all when the idea 01 an alliance against Chile could also be considered. Furthermore, the temptation lor Argentina as a power in the Pacífic has never been absent Irom successive governments 01 tha! country, which is particularly attractive as a means 01 counterbalancing the power which Brazil has in the Atlantic. On the other hand, there were versions which indicated that Perón a.chíeved important linancial support Irom the considerable monetary reserves 01 the Arab countries; it ís presumed that this was linked with the production 01 arms in Argentina lor the consequent supply 01 these countries, who were having serious difficulties with their traditional suppliers. This would be in accordance with Argentina's own aspirations lor hegemony in Latin America. Be as it may, it is a lactthat once again Chile's economic weakness and political chaQs were not the best guarantees lor her external security. Nor did the new Treaty lor the settlement 01 disputes, whose projections were the material for an important national debate, seem lO contribute to this. The symbol 01 friendship which was present in the 81