Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

compensation oís secondary. The actíon was one of Allende's most serious blunders for it gave the US government a reason or a pretext to oppose the Chilean government. even if only in an indirect manner. It seems unlikely that the copper company harassment of the Chilean government would have taken place if some compensation had been paid. In any event, nothing the US government or business did was nearly as disruptive of the Chilean economy as the economic policies of the Popular Unity government, among them the wholesale printing of money. A word on US "Development assistance" aid to Chile. The United States had given the prevíous Chilean government an extraordinary amount of aid because Eduardo Frei was an exceptionally popular national reformer who was friend Iy to the USo It is hardly surprising that when Freí was replaced by agovernmenf led by the Communist and Social ist partíes, Chile would no longer be considered a model for Latin America and aid would be reduced. That should be common sense to all but a few radicals. To putthe aid issue in some perspective, it should be noted that US assistance even to the Frei government had been decreasing rapid Iy for three years. US aid reached its peak in 1967 and was reduced drastically each year thereafter, falling from $238-million in 1967 to $26-million in 1970. Aid during Allende's first year totalled $8.6-million. What can we say about the present Chilean government and prospects for the future? Reliable information is scarce and the government is untried. Thus we would be advised not to be dogmatic in our judgements. The governmen! seems to have won al leas! conditional support from most of the oppositíon force s and, it would appear, some Popular Unity supporters who are relieved to have at least some form of order re-established. This conditional support will disappear. however. if the government is unable to improve the general politica!, economic and social conditions it inherited. Its assignment will be complicated by many former Popular Unity supporters and ultra-Ieftists who háve drawn in their horns for the moment but have certainly not yet said their last word. Problems will be all the greater ifthere is a significant difference ofopinion within the military itself. as there well may be. It is not likelythat the previous constitutional form 01 government will be re-established in the forese(~able future though participation of some large and important sectors of the population will occur. The direction 01 international contacts has already shifted away from the so-called socialist world and the present government. if it survi'les. will be closer to the United SIates than Popular Unity ever was. We cannot begin to learn from the Chilean experience until we clearly understand what the general Hnes of the experience actually were. 61