Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

opposition forces- íncluded an important sector of Allende's own Socíalist Party, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, known as the MIR by its Spanish inltials, and assorted smaller groups. These organizations long maintaíned that a true restructuríng of society would come only after an armed showdown between the exploiters and the exploited. Ultra-Ieftists, most importantly the MIR, encouraged and led workers, peasants and students in what they openly acknowledged were illegal seizures of private property in an effort to push the revolution ahead and increase the political consciousness of the Chilean people. MIR leaders themselves claimed some 1500 iIlegal occupations during the first six months of 1971 alone. One MIR leader aCkriowledged in a clandestine interview after the coup that "top priority" had been given to agitational and organizational work in the. armed forces, as the opposition politicians and military leaders had charged. Ultra-Ieftists were alsó actively engaged in arming the workers and peasants. Violent confrontations had occurred between armed workers and military forces well before the coup. One non-Chilean who had been active in organizing Chilean workers before the coup acknowledged, after fleeing the country, that in some factories there had been more guns than people to fire them. President Allende's most outspoken supporters frequently say that the mysterious entity called "the people" was behind the president and his programs. The very name "Popular Unity", or "People's Unity", is intended to suggest majority support for the coalition. But just how much support did the Popular Unity actually have? Allende won 36 percent of the vote in the popular election in September 1970; the National Party candidate got 35 percent and the Christian Democrat 28 percen!. Allende's vote fell considerably below the absolute majority required for direct election lo the presidency. 1hus in accordance with the natíonal constitution. the congress wasempowe– red to electeither ofthe two leading candidates in special session.That is to say, Congress could have elected Allende or National Party candidate Jorge Alessandri (who traiJed the frontrunner by less than 40,000 out of three million votes). Since the Popular Unity controlled only 80 of 200 seats in Congress. cand idate Allende had to win the support of many Christian Democrats to secure the presidency. It was accepted procedure for the congress to elect the frontrunner in the popular election, and Allende not surprisingly insisted that this tradilional practice should be followed as always. Though many Christian Democrats wanted to follow the precedent, or felt obliged to do so, most were deeply apprehensive about the Popular Unity's long-term intentions. They decided to vote Allende only after the candidate agreed to a conslitutional amendment speciJically aimed at guaranteeing the traditional freedoms of the Chilean people. At the end of October 1970congress elected Allende by a strong margin of five to one. He was inaugurated in November 1970. Three monlhs after his inauguration, Allende told French Marxist Régis Debray that he fel! the majority of the Chilean people were or would be behind him on the importan! revolutionary issues. He remarked: "If we put forward a bill and congress rejects il, we invoke a plebiscite. 1'11 give you an example: we propose that thére should no longer be two houses in congress; the proposal is rejected by congress, we hold a referendum and win. Hence the end of the two house system... " . If Ihere was ever a time when the Popular Unity might have found such support among the Chilean people, it was during the first six to nine months of Allende's termo During this period, government economic policies briefly increased the buying power and consump– tion of substantial portibns of soc iety. Popular Unity cand idates won 49 percent of the vote in the April 1971 nationwide municipal elections. It was not until after this election that the opposition parties began to run joint candidates, economic conditions took a turn for the worse, and Popular Unity candidates fel! off.at the polls. The last nationwide election -for most ofthe seats in the national congress-took place six months before the coup. The Popular Unity won just over 43 percen! of the v9te against almos! 55 percent for the opposition. Thus Popular Unity support went up seven percentage points from Ihe 1970 national elections, bul down six points from the recent national 58