Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

the face of improbable body-counts: the figure of 20,000 or 30,000 killed that was bandied around in the House of Commons during a recent debate, tor example, or the much-quoted Newsweek claim that the Santiago morgue had processed more than 2,700 bodies in the fortnight after the September coup-a figure that later turned out to be the official tally for all bodies processed since 1 January. . No reliable estimate ot the casualties since the coup is as yet available. In the order of quantities, -the Chilean coup was bloody by comparison with the Greek coup in 1967, bloodless by comparison with the aftermath of the military takeover in Indonesia in 1965. It has almost certainly cost fewer lives than the brief civil war that tollowed the overthrow and suicide of an earlier Chilean president, Balmaceda, in 1891-when more than '10,000 people (out of a population only a fifth the present size) were killed. But such comparisons are probably not what matters. Chile's new rulers tace the familiar temptation ot the victors in any internal war: to clair:n their revenge, and to claim in self-justification that it was the other side that "started it". The continuing violence suggests that they, or their subordina– tes, have not been able to resíst that temptation. In a country as deeply polarised as Chile has become, it will not be an easy task to persuade those who tormerly supported the Allende government (and this means at least 40 % of the electorate) to accept the new order of things. This is why no senior officer is talking of restoring the constitutional process in less than a year. General Augusto Pinochet. told me that he felt tha! Ihe counlry was only al Ihe beginning ot Ihe "healing process". He argued Ihat Ihe military mus! be allowed time lo "depolilicise" the Chileans, who were once described by Eduardo Frei as a nalion "sick with ideology". General Leigh compares Ihe stale of Chile lo thal of "a drain that has become clogged up with mud and debris", and íl has to be "cleared away before the water can flow agaín". It is not really surprising that the politicalleaders of the Centre and the Right are ready lo accept the need for a 1-2 year period of mililary rule, with the exception of a group of left-wing Christian Democrats associated with Bernardo Leighlon and Radomiro Tomic. For one thing, it is cl.ear that the labour of economic reconstruction will involve unpopular austerity measures, and the party leaders would preter to see the armedtorces take responsibility tor them. Tha! way they do not lose votes. There is also the probabi litYthat the extreme Left is preparing a terrorist campaign. Again, the political party leaders would prefer lo see the high command lake responsibilily tor dealing wilh tha!. Bul al Ihe same time, the pOliticalleaders who look a stand againsl Allende expect lo be given a place in the new system. One of the early mistakes of the junta was to till most vacant positions -i n the civil service as well as the cabinet- with retired or serving officers. This reflected both the traditional isolation of the armed torces from society in general and the coñviction that it was necessary for the junta to transcend party allegiances in order to present a "national image". The influence of key civilian advisers, like Raúl Saez, who was initially seen by the junta as a kind of economic supremo, was connected with their personal entrée lo the armed forces as well as with their personal capacities.(8) But outside the economic sector, the armed forces established a virtual monopoly of the new administration-filling ambassadorships and even university rectorships as well as cabinet jobs. The junta overreached itself badly by placing military men as rectors in most (8)Sáez was only one 01 Ihe civilian experts called by the junta to advise on how to straighten oullhe economy in the days 101l0wing the coup. Orlando Sáenz, the combative young president 01 the industrialists' association. SOFOFA, was given an important role as economic adviser lo the loreign ministry. Roberto Kelly, a retired naval olficer and successlul private businessman, was made minisler-director 01 the state planning agency, ODEPLAN, and a team 01 able young economisls who had worked on a draft programme lor economic reconstruction over the months belore the coup quicklylound iobs in the adminislration. A month after the coup, General Rolando González, an indeCisive army olficer who was originally handed Ihe economics portloliO, was replaced by Fernando Leniz, the lormer presidenl 01 El Mercurio, Ihe major independen! newspaper Ihal had played a decisive role in Ihe opposition to Allende. As these appoinlmenls suggest, the junta soon grasped Ihe need to place the economy under the control 01 qualilied meno 55