Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

Merino went back to the squadron at Val paraíso happy enough with this arrangement. But he found that his féllow-officers were not willing totrust Allende's word.lt was agreed that if Allende still refused to take immediate ection the following Friday (the date set for Merino's next appointment with the president) the signal would be given to launch "Operation Seaweed", The chief of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Patricio Carvajal, had been working for some months to get closer collaboration between the three services and the Carabine– ros, but it was still unclear whether the Navy would have to go it alone, Merino duly kept his appointment onFriday the 7th, and found that Allende was stillunready to sack Montero, He did not argue this time. He went back to Val paraíso and gave the signal to launch Plan Cochayuyo. The original date far the coup was Monctay the 10th, but General Pinochet asked far a 24-hour delay to prepare the Army. The timing was settled when Admiral Huidobro drove up to the capital on Sunday with a small square of lined notepaper concealed in his sock, The message from Merino read: "D-Day is Tuesday. The hour is 0600. (signedf José Toribio", General Gustavo Leigh, the new Air Force commander, and General Augusto Pinochet examined it in Pinochet's house, and then wrote the word Conforme (" I ag ree ") on the back of the paper and signed thei r names, If they had any remaining doubts about the justification for what they were planning, these had been diminished by the violent speech delivered by Senator Altamirano the previous day, which amounted to incitement to the naval ratings to rebel against their officers. Two major problems remained: to enlist the support of the para-military Carabineros, whose leaders were mainly pro-Allende men, and to mobilise the troops without alerting the Government to the true nature ofthe plol. The first problem was solved when the Carabinero General Yovane cast in his lot with the conspiratú,s, General César Mendoza (N.o 7 in the strict orderof seniority) followed suit. Their adhesion meant that, on the morningofthe coup, Allende found himself abandoned by his police guard at the palace, who turned their armoured cars (tanquetas) inwards to point at him. Securitywas also fairly well kept. The fleet put oulto sea on Monday, supposedlyto join in manoeuvres (Operation Unitas) with the Americans, and when it sailed back to harbour around dawn on Tuesday, it seems that Allende thought that he only had to contend with an isolated naval rising. Suspicious that something was afoot, he had telephoned to General Herman Brady (the Santiago garrison commander) around midnight, to enquire whether everything was all right. Brady, who had been close to Allende in the past, assured him that the Army was ready to deal with any contingency, although he had already received his marching orders from Pinoche!. It is almost certain that Allende would not have driven to his palace on Tuesday morning had he realised that he was not dealing merely with a handful of dissident admirals, but with the united strengh of his armed forces. He drove to his death.(6) THE GUERRILLA BLUFF In a heated discussion with the generals over the resignation of Admirallsmael Huerta from the cabinet in January 1973, Allende declared that, if they ever turned against him, he would not commit suicide or seek exile in Cuba, "1 will take refuge in the Cordón Cerrillos", he warned, "and you will never get me out". The Cordón Cerrillos is one of those industrial suburbs that point like knife-blades towards the centre of Santiago. These suburbs -and the squatters' camps, or campamen– tos- dotted around the outskirts of the city were viewed ,by the revolutionary Left as the bases for an eventual October-style insurrection, Within the state-run industries, workers (6)The lestimony 01 his own doctor and the photographs 01 his body make íl clear Iha! he committed suicide with !he automatic weapon senllo him as a gift by Fidel Castro. He had been firillg il from a window earlier Ihal morning, 52