Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

portions of i1. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p. m., Allende decided to discontinue the resistence, and themembers who had been with him leftthe building in single file, led bythe secretary carrying awhite flag. Allende sta'ed behind and, sitting on a sofa in a receptionroom on the second floor, put two bullets into ~is head. The automatic rifle that he used was a gift from Fidel Castro.(31) CONCLUSIONS. Since the coup, comments in the world press representing widely divergent political postures have cited the Chilean case as proofthat the hope of achieving Marxist socialism through democratic means is a vain one. Yet most people have failed to note twofundamen– tal errors of the Allende policy, neither of which was essentially related to the attempt to establish democratic socialism: 1. As noted at the outset, the very quotation from Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his administration to justify his course states as a prerequisite "the support of the majority of the people':. Allende acted as if he had that support, but even at the highest point of his popularity in the April1971 elections, he never achieved i1. Moreover, his policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at expanding his electoral base, was moresuccess– fui in pitting professional and middle-class groups against him than in widening his support among workers, peasants and low-income groups. 2. Marxist economists and policymakers have always placed primary emphasis on investmeot and the expansion of the productive capacity of the economy. By contrasto the Allende policymakers emphasized increases in consumption and combined this with a headlong rush to take over industry and agriculture-a course far removed from the "two steps forwara, one step back"of Lenin. The consequences of these policies after their deceptive initial success were massive government deficits, runaway inflation, and a near-breakdown of the economy. (The argument that Allende's economic problems were the result of a shortage of foreign credit does not really hold water, since they were caused by policies initiated before the foreign squeeze and since, in any event, Allende's regime managed to secure enough foreign credits from Latin American, European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase the Chilean foreign debtfrom $2.6 billion to $3.4 billion in less than three years. Much of the new indebledness was to Western Europe and other Latin American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt lo the USSR, China and Eastern Europe increased only from $9 million lo $ 40 million between 1970 and 1973.)(32) Specific aspecls of Ihe Chilean system also made the Allende experiment a particu; larly diffícult one. He was able to come to power in the first place because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the democratic system and because the Marxist parties were ableto mobilize a part ofthe proletariat and the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many instruments for state control of the economy which had been developed by previous administrations since the 1930's. However, he was required to operate within an institutio– nal system which included frequent and staggered elections, proportional representation, and a multiparty system which made majority rule very difficult and often gave veto powers to the extremes of Right and Left. The economy .had been characterized for nearly a century (31)On Allende's suicide, seethe medical report inEI Mercurio (International Edition), Oc!. 29-Nov. 4,1973, pp. 1 and 7. The eyewitness testimony 01 one 01 the President's personal physicians, who entered the room immedia!aly thereafter. is published in Ercilla, Jan. 2-8, 1974 pp. 10-13. Allende's widow has asserted that witnesses told her they had seen bullet wounds in his chestand stomach. A supposed account by a personal bodyguard circulated in Mexico and elsewhere describing his murder conlains numerous lactual errors and describes events which could no! have taken place because 01 the physical design 01 the building. On this and many other myths 01 Left and Right concerning the overthrow 01 Allende. see Paul E. Sigmund, "Allende through the MythS, " Worldview (New York) Apríl 1974 pp. 16-21, (32)Secretaría, Comité Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso (CIAP), El Esfuerzo Interno y las Necesida– des de Financiamiento Externo para el Desarrollo de Chile (Domestic Efforts and the Needs lor External Financing lor the Development 01 Chile), Washington, OC, 1974, p. V-9. 37