Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

for refusing to promulgate the constitutiona! reforms voted by the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial orders, encouraging illegal seizure of property. persecuting opposition labor groups, and supporting illegal paramilitary organizations, In conclusion. it stated that the listed actions constituted a "serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic" and urged the military ministers to "put an end to the de jacto situations listed above which violate the Constitution and the law" or be guilty of "compro– mising the national and professional character of the armed forces". In ¡ts original form, the resolution had declared the Allende government to be illegiti– mate, but theacuerdo had later been softened in order to secure the support ofthe Christian Democrats. Yet its effect was still to give a congressional green light to the military. and Allende immediately so interpreted jI. He replied tothe motíon by accusing the Congress of "promoting a coup d' état by asking the military forces to make governmentaljudgments independently of the authority and direction of the President"; he also pointed out that according to the Constitution the only way that the Congress could decide on the legality of the President's conduct of his office was through impeachment by a two-thirds vote,(25) The congressional vote was echoed by several professional associations, The Medical Association called on their"colleague" Allende to resign-a request thatwas echoed bythe Federation of Professionals (CUPROCH)- and resignation petitions were circulated in Santiago. The Lawyers' Association issued a declaration which -"without attributing a malevolent intention" to the President- asserted an "incompatibility betweer:t theinstitutio– nal framework within which he is supposed to exercise his office and the actions which he feels obliged to carry out in his program". Arguing that Allende "would appear to be incapacitt:tted (impedido) in the exercise of his functions as he understands them". the statement suggested that he could be removed from offiGe under Article 43 of the Constitu– tion. which authorizes the Congress to declare presidential incapacity,(26) THECOUP Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup was made is not yel certain. but il evidenlly was reached in the days following Prats' resignation, The armed forces had contingency plans for the control of vital pOints throughout'the country in case of any emergency, and it only required a signal to put them in to operation, Hence the actual seizure of control required little preparation. After the resignations of the third week oí August. Allende restructured his cabinet without the top mil itary commanders but still retained representatives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as Minister of the Interior hi.s Socialist colleague Carlos Briones, who was known to be interested in another attempt at accommodation with the Christian Democrats. The president also canceled a projected trip to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers. The government and the opposition again staged rival demonstrations in connection with the third anniversary of the 1970 presidential elections. On the weekend before the coup, the Christian Democrats called all provincial party leaders to a meeting al which a proposal was adopted for the simultaneous resignation of the Congress and the President and for new elections to resolve the conflict between the executive and legislative branches. During the same weekend, Allende met wlth the leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and called for the hOlding of a plebiscite on his conduct of office. Although this step was reportedly opposed by the Socialists, Briones (25)EI Mercurio (Internátional Edilion) Aug. 20-26, 1973, p. 5. The chairman 01 the Chrístian Democratic Party told the New York Times lhat "neíther we nor lhe armed forces favor anY¡hing bu! a democratíc solution to Chile's polítical crisis" bul emphasized Ihal Ihe only way to avoid a breakdown 01 the Conslílulion was lhe appoínlmenl 01 mililary men ín al leas! síx cabine! pOSIS, as well as in key undersecrelary positions and as heads 01 the chiel governmenlal agencies. The New York Times, Aug. 27, 1973, p. 12. (26)EI Mercurio (Internatíonal Edition), Aug. 26-Sept, 1, 1973, p. 7. 35