Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

LAST STAGE-DECLINE AND FALL On June 29, the last act of the Chilean tragedy began with an abortive revolt by the Second Armored Regiment in Santiago. Apparently, several army units had been in contact with Patria y Libertad, a right-wing political organization, and had planned to seize President Allende at his residence and to occupy the presidential palace. The revolt was canceled one day before it was to occur, but when one of the officers of the Second Armored Regiment was arrested and held in the Defense Ministry, the Regiment decided to free him and in the process to seize the presidential palace as originally planned. General Prats, the Army Commander, used the other military units in Santiago to put down the revolt in a few hours -most of which were spent in negotiation rather than shooting- but not before President Allende had gone on the air to urge "the people" to take over all industries and enterprises as a response to the uprising of "a small group of rebellious military men". The Central Labor Federation also urged the workers to occupy the factories, and in one day the' number of companies taken over by the government rose from 282 to 526. The "Industrial Belts" that had sprung up at the time of the October strike now achieved new importance. The spread of "people's power" (poder popular) had been seen by Allende as a deterrent to a possible future' coup, but it created many additional problems for the government. Production declined sharply after the takeovers, the opposition gol fresh fuel for ils claim that the expansion of state control of industry was being carried out through extralegal channels, and "poder popular" -as expressed in the worker occupations- appeared to some extent to pose a possible threat of an alternative lO the power of the central govern– ment. After the June 29 revolt, Allende made new efforts to secure military involvement in the government, but his negotiations with the armed forces were unsucceseful.(20) Instead, they embarked on a pOlicy of vigorous enforcement of the Arms Control Law, a measure which had been adopted in October 1972 but only sporadically enforced Ihereafter. This law authorized any military or police commanders to carry out arms searehes ifthere was "a presumption of the clandestine existence of illegal firearms".(21) The right-wing Patria y Libertad organization had now announced publicly that it was going underground in an attempt to overthrow the gbvernment by force, and military intelligence was also aware of the initiation of arms training by all the government parties, even the centrist Radicals.(22) In the course of their crackdown, the mi Iitary found arms caches in factories in'Santiago and Concepción, and the killing of a worker in one such arms raid provoked protests from the leftist parties. Ai this point, the Chilean Communist Party and the Catholic Church both cOílcluded indepenoontly that the only solution to the impasse in Chile was one more attempt al an agreement between the Allende government parties and the Christian Democrats. The Communists initiated a campaígn against civiJ war almost simultaneously with a statement by the Chilean hierarchy calling tor a renewal of dialogue. Probably in response lo these pressures on both sides, two lengthy discussions took place on July 31 between UP and PDC representatives. Both Allende and the Christian Democrals agreed on the necessity of enforcement of the Arms Control Law, but dísagreement continued on the constitutional reforms. Allende offered to sign the amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" in return for a constitutional amendment specifying that the Congress could only overríde presíden– tial vetoes of constitutional amendments by a tw6-thírds vote. He also proposed the (20)Two conflicling accqunls 01 Ihose negoliations appear in Ercilla (Santiago), July 11-17, 1973, pp. 7-10, (21 )Law N.o 17.798, Diario Oficial (Santiago), Oc!. 21, 1972. By a quirk 01 late the law had come to Allende's desk in Ihe midst 01 the October slrike, and since it had the strong support di the armed lorces, he was compelled lo sign it despite the opposition 01 Ihe Socialisl Party and lhe MIR. (22)Allende's personal bodyguard had organized courses in armstraining at his vacation house outside 01 Santiago.'The MAPU began armS-Iraíning in December 1972, and Ihe Radícals did so in July 1973. The armed forces were aware of Ihís al leas! by Ihe end 01 July. See documents in Libro Blanco, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196-200. JJ