Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

rare exception from the upper bourgeoisie, rare exception, Number three, the Chilean mílitary was very unfriendly to the Frei government and to the United States at the time 01 Allende's election; lor a number 01 very good reasons, We had practically cut olf all aid to them; and the legislation passed by the-U,S, Congress wlÍich put a ceiling on sales and grants for all 01 Latin America. And that meant a lew million dollars lor Chile in trainíng and resupplies 01 minimal character. The Frei government relused their ,demands on the grounds it would contribute to inllation, The Chilean military repeatedly appealed to me to íntervene with Freí to get this kínd 01 hardwar, that kínd. We just didn't do il. and instead we delíberately wou'n'd down our presence. BUCKLEY: You just linished alleging that the leaders of the military were demonstrably pro-Allende until they saw finally the direction in which he was taking the c9untry. KORRY: Ves, that's a very good point It is the point And moreoverwe had saíd that the Chílean mílitary would never lead Chile, it would always followthe people. Therelore, in my view, it was not worth paying a lot of attention to them, because they would always be in the vanguard. BUCKLEY: It's nol all that unusual. Just go one country north and see on whose side the military is; hardly on the side of the capitalist class, which they just finished appropriating. LAMBLE: Well, he also makes the point that he leels what essentially happened in Chile in the coup that overthrew Allende was the attempt to duplicate the situation in Brazil, where the mil itary took over in very repressive lashion, And this seems to be exactly what happened. ; . KORRY: That is a different judgment, that is someihing quite differenf: 'But tiétween May of 71 and late 73 when Allende was thrown out. Altamirano had carried out his entire poi icy, That is, he had radicalized that situation. He had imposed his veto over the Communist Party on a number 01 things. One, business with the United States. But more important, I think that the Communist Party of Chile, and Allende were predisposed to bring in at least part of the Christian Democratic Party, several times, in order lo divide and fragment the largest party 01 Chile, and to eliminate it as a force, and to push President Freí ¡nto the camp 01 the right I think that Altamírano vetoed that on a number 01 occasions. And he was beginning to pass out arms to a great number of people in Chile. He was trying to sLibvert the Navy 01 Chile. There was never any question 01 his guilt in that BUCKLEY: We have only a few seconds, let me just ask you to reply briefly to Prolessor Thompson's query. Do you think that diplomats ofthe future must continue to understand thattheir role will ¡nclude supervision 01, or acquiescence in covert activity? KORRY: Ves, il the Congress so reaffirms, BUCKLEY: And it is your'judgment the Congress will reaffirm it? KORRY: Finally, yes, BUCKLEY: Thank you very much, Ambassador Korry. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen 01 the panel. Thank you all.