Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

BUCKLEY: And Ihey didn'l work? KORRY: No, lhey didn'l work. BUCKLEY: Al! righl, so Ihen we did move to pOint three, right? KORRY: Then I left. BUCKLEY: Bul you presumably... KORRY: I was nol kepl informed after, BUCKLEY: You were not kepl informed? KORRY: No. BUCKLEY: But you presumably have made sorne deductions? KORRY: Only what I read. BUCKLEY: Only whal you read. And what you read persuades... KORRY: I have no reason to doubt what Mr. Colby is saying. BUCKLEY: Uh-huh. KORRY: Or is alleged to have said. The only thing that he denied in his letter to the Times is the use of the word destabilization. BUCKLEY: So, Iherefore, he is denying that part of the charge, that he went around the world getting in the way of Chíle's request for economíc credít? KORRY: No, no, I don'l think he had anything to do with i1. The CIA would not be doing that, in any case, I think what he is denying is the CIA set out to overthrow Allende. I think he is making the distinction if I understand whalwe're both reading in the newspapers, it is that they did not set out to overthrow Allende. They set out to try to keep in existence those democratic torces until the 1976 Presidential elections. You have to remember that the head of lhe Communist Party before the election hadsaid that if -once they were in, there would be an irreversible-- I beg your pardon, he said this after the election in an interview with the Rome Communist newspaper, Un ita; he said that the political structure wot.lld be irreversible and nobody that I knew in Chile took that to mean anything other than whal il literally signified, that there would be no way you could reverse il for many years lo come. There might be pro forma elections bu! no way to change the system. BUCKLEY: Well now are you saying Ihen thal in your diplomatic experíence it is simply, it is a commonplace torthe United Slates lO help lO maintain democratic practices in countries in which there are democratic practices? I don't imagine there was much tor the CIA to do in Ethiopia, was there, when you were there? KORRY: No, nothing. BUCKLEY: Nothing. But this is implicit with the observations. KORRY: No, I think that there is a contusion, and I can understand it; and I will not attempt lo lalk tor the President of the Uniled Slates. Mr. Ford has said what U.S. policy is, or Henry Kissinger. I wi 11 tell you, though, what I said to my government, to Dr. Kissinger al the time, and you may draw your own conclusions. I said that basically there were three American interests Ihal were overriding in Chile. One is that al a time lhal we were about to leave, whether it was admitted or not. about to beg In the scale down and withdrawal from Vietnam, and about to launch new initiatives with Moscowand Peking, lhal tor th", Jnited States to act indifferent to lhe disappearing of a democracy, of a unique democracy in what was viewed throughout the world as its back yard, could have a significant effect on those who made policy in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. That's number one. And I will jusi say parenthetically that those two governments, in Moscow and Peking, described Ihe Allende Iriumph aS an enormous defeat for the Uniled Slales, and tor imperialism throughout the world, and a tremendous victory, And that's number one. Number two, al that lime there were elections coming up in both France and Italy, popular-front tactics which had to do with the whole fundamental slructure ot western defense, western ideals. So the Chilean model could have a certain effect. Numberthree, the American public was unaware, because il often tends lo give others the benet;t of a doubt and look at il from a superficial point of view -tha! is, to look at the mask, rather than the realíty behind il"'" the American public did no! realize Ihat we were 294