Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

But there was a second reason. If we could reach agreement on these things and we were also reaching agreements on much lesser and simpler problems concerning the number of Peace Corps in the country, the military advisors in the country, the military aid and all of these things. But 1f we could reach agreement on these others, we would develop a momentum that proved that the United States as a mature power could get along with any kind of government in this world as long as it did not act irrationally. I mean after all we were doing that -we were about to change our policy with the Soviet Un ion. We had perfectly normal relations with them in the diplomatic and the government sense. Why couldn't we have it with Allende in Chile? BUCKLEY: And so? KORRY: And so we tried. BUCKLEY: And he proceeded to act irrationally in what way? KORRY: Well, he broke his word to me not simply on the Cerro Copper agreement which had takeri five months to negotiate and really had been an incredibly taxing proce– dure for me. Let me say one word about Cerro. Unlike the Anaconda or Kennecotl Copper compa– nies which were larger, Cerro had not been in Chile before Allende. That is, they were in the process of developing their mine and it came on screen after Allende's election. They had -they were a partner in the Chilean government and they were a partner in the Japanese. A three way deal. They had acted impeccably and this mine had been put in high in the Andes underground in an earthquake-prone zone. Everybody thought they were mad to put in that money so it was an enormous gamble on their part and the overrun had been more than a hundred percenl. They had fourteen million dollars in U.S. guarantees and their own money was well over thirty by the time they got through with il. Well, the Allende government began by handing over or else ultimatum in writing and then we may give you something but then very little. The company came to me and said what should r do about it and my reaction was very much Iike the Bobby Kennedy reaction to the Khrushchev ultimatum in the eyeballto-eyéball. I said ignore the bad part and stick to the good part and I asked ifthey would write me to try to work out some sort of dialogue and I did. A dialogue developed. Allende named five negotiators, two Communists, two left wing Socialists, and his Minister of Mines. It took fíve months to negotiate this thing and I was the middle man and the agreement was reached. Allende personally expressed his happiness that we had dooe this to me. The five Chilean negotiations, four of them in point of fact, the Minister didn't go, gave a party for Mr. Gordon Murphy, the Chairman of the Board for Cerro, the night before this was to be signeq on nationwide television. They invited me to the party; they invited me to the nationwide TV signing.1 refused to go thinking it was better to keep the U.S. government out of this thing. Well, thirty minutes before this was to be signed Mr. Allende said he was terribly sorry there'd have to be a postponement. He explained to me he had quote "a little trouble in my chicken coop" unquote, to which I replied -and he asked me for two weeks to sort it out and told me to assure Washington that he would do this. I said, Mr. President, it is your country. I can't give you two minutes, two weeks, two years. It is entirely your decision. I.know the rooster who is loose from your chicken coop, Senator Altamirano. 1didn't name him so as to spare any emba– rrassment and 1said I would have to inform Washington in all honesty... BUCKLEY: We're going to have to accelerate thís now. KORRY: 1would have to inform Washington in all honesty that Allende could not sign the agreements he negotiated, that there was no point in my negotiations with him any further. That is when I said we're getting to the end of the line. BUCKLEY: It ís then that you started to slide from point two to point three? KORRY: No, we then made a further eHort. We came back with a brand new proposal. I came home, got Dr. Kissinger's okey separately, and Secretary William Rogers in the State Department, to go back and make a whole new set of proposals concerning the big copper companies which was the most unusual the United States has ever put forward. 293