Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

the reason he stopped was that a veto was interposed by the then head 01 the Socialist Party, Senator Carlos Altamirano. The Socialist Party, incidentally, it should be emphasized, is in Chile lar to the left of the Communists and there was an unending roar between these two parties before and during and I'm sure after Dr. Allende's election, with the Communist.s accusing Dr. Altamirarto of reckless leftism. That was the term they used. And Dr. Altaml– rano wanted to have a violent class war; he wanted no agreements wlth the Unlted States. He wanted to have these dramatic encounters. BUCKLEY: So what you're saVing is that Altamirano simply rejected the noUon of minimal cooperation so you sUd from point one to point two. KORRY: Well. we were in point two all the time (OVERTALK) the correct relationship in public. BUCKLEY: But you were having a fljer (?) with one? KORRY: That's right. BUCKLEY: Now, having slid to point two, were you still there when it slid over into point three? KORRY: No. When point one cOllapsed, that was -1 should say that there was an intervening episode. We had spend live months to get certain agreements with the Allende government. He had all personally on them. People think this enormous effort was made on behalf of the multinational corporations involved because they had to do with companies. but my ¡nterest is 01 a different order. Firstly, the United States Congress which presumably knows what it was doing had com'mitled to Chile, the Frei administration, almost two billion dollars to one of the smallest countries in the world. At the time it starled it had barely seven mili ion people and by the time Ileft it was nine million. Now these two billion dollars were -was an investment by the United States taxpayer 01 Congress and their representatives in the most stable, tested. freest democracy in South America. a democracywhich was ola totally different profile than any other country in all 01 Latin America. Ninety percen! of all Chileans are literate, were literate. Eighty-live percent of those eligible voted in elections, which is belter than in this country. Seventy percent 01 them were urban, very few landholders. There were practically no great lortunes in the sense that you had them in Peru or Colombia. In Chile one person rnight have qualilied lor being in the five million dollar class of assets. In neighboring Peru you have -what?- twenty, lorty, lifty of them. You had a huge middle class in Chile. You had social democracy -it was already a status society overwhelmingly. By the time Allende was elected, the Frei government had effectively nationalized the copper industry. It had nationalized just abou! every other industry because at the time when the last budget of Frei, lor the year 69-70, sixty-three percent of all investments was in the public sector. Allende only raised that amount to eighty pereent so it was not mueh of a change in poliey but it had -but Ihe changes had to do wilh Ihe democracy. Now democracy in Chile meanl exactlywhat il meanl in the United Stales. Even more: It meant an unlettered press. It meanl a multipartied Congress. It meant an independent judiciary. It meant an apolitical army, an army that never participated in politics. BUCKLEY: And what happened? KORRY: Allende changed all these things. But belore tha! I want to say what it is that -why I lelt that dealing with those corporations had to do with this investments. Par! of our investment was to give guarantees to American investors against expropriation and tha! mean! any fresh investment that they would put into Chile- and the biggest part was lo double the copper production in Chile -il there were exproprialions without adequate and effective compensation, then the U.S. government through the Overseas Private Inveslment Corporation, a government agency, would have lo pay Ihose guarantees. Our exposure al Ihal lime was almost half a billion dollars. I fell as Ihe represenlalive ollhe American laxpayer that il was encumbenl upon me lo try lo prevenl Iheir paying Ihat- Ihat is... BUCKLEY: Their having to pay... KORRY: Their having to paya half a billion dollars. So the lirst thing I had to do was lo try either lo eliminale the immediate cal! on Ihose resources or poslpone Ihem. And thal is why I went in that direction. 292