Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

proceeds on the assumption that, while you were Ambassador, the CIA was spending money trying to bribe members of the Senate in Chile to get them to cast their votes against Allende. KORRY: Excuse me, I testified under oath and I repeat it now and I call your attention to the fact that the subcommíttee has now concluded that I told the truth, that there was no attempt at any time to bribe any member of the Chilean Congress. Now the reason that I could testify to that effect and the reason that I do not challenge that anything that Mr. Colby may have said, and I have no idea what he actually said because Mr. Harrington, a member of the Congress of Massachusetts, has only referred to what he read from the transcript but was not allowed to take notes about so his errors may be unavoidable due to the complexíty ofthe testimony by Mr. Colby, but let me saythatwhatever may have beE'n autnorized bythe so-called Forty Committee for the CIA to do, it was not done insofeJ as it applied to any bribery attempt of the Chilean Congress. Now the reason foro th!s distinction is that the Chilean Congress was going to meet in the last week of October of 1971 to decide whether to confírm Mr. Allende's... BUCKLEY: Of 'lO. KORRY: Of '70, I beg your pardon. Of 1970 whether to confirm Dr. Allende's election as President or to indulge in the Constitutional alternative that they have to select the runner– up. In late September of that year, a month before that date, I reported to Washington tha t there was no possibility of any kind that Dr. Allende would not be confirmed as Presiden; and I wanted to return to Washington to discuss what policy we should carry out with Dr. Allende as President of Chile and I further warned gratuitously that if anyone in Washington were to be thinking of a United States intervention dírect or indirect to bar Allende from the Presidency, they should be fui Iy aware thatthe consequences would be worse than the Bay of Pigs both in Chile and in the United States. BUCKLEY: Okay, what th,at tells us is that you were opposed to any attempt to prevent the installation of Allende. But what it doesn't Quite tell us is whether your advice was followed. KORRY: No, I would say that if that is the impression I give, I wish to correct it I was dead set against Dr. Allende as a candidate and everything that he stood for.And I must say the professionals in the embassy and the foreign service offices and I were in total, unanimous agreement that what -what Allende would do as President of Chile.and what the effectswould be on United States interests, particularlyoutside ofChile and outside of Latín America. There are reports of that period that look more like a description written after the fact, after the death of Allende, than as a forecast if read today. Dr. Allende knew my position.1 discussed itwith him afterhe became President, as a maUeroffact.1 was agaínst an attempt by the United States to gel itself involved in an intervention against Allende to keep him out of office. 1would have welcomed and I testified to this before the Senate subcommittee and I told any newspaperman who was there atthe time, I.would have gladly welcome the Chilean Congress voting to keep him out of office. Or the Chilean people doing whatever they would. I was against the United States doing it. BUCKLEY: Mr. Korry, you speak with renowned ludicity on all matters but you haven't yet told me whether you had personal knowledge that the CrA did atlempt to accomplish that which you would not have attempt'ed to accomplish but which you would have welcome the happening of. KORRY: In my time? No. BUCKLEY: Your answer is no what? KORRY: In my time I have knowledge they did not try. BUCKLEY: You have knowledge they did not try. KORRY: To the best of my reportoríal capacity to find out, 1have knowledge that in my time they did not try. BUCKLEY: Okay, that leaves lhree alternative possibilities. Colby said something which, in fact, is not true. Not intending il, but because his memory slipped. Orwhat he said was misrecorded by Michael Harrington when Michael Harrington read the transcript and then relied on hís memory. Or they actually sent down aCIA agent and said, for god's sake, don't tel! Ambassador Korry what you're up to, but try slipping a few hundred grand to the Senators. KORRY: No, we díd not try that It wasn't tried... BlICKLEY: You said to the best of your reportorial (OVERTALK). KORRY: 1know but the Senate subcommlttee has now in its wisdom said that there is a 288