Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

American sovereignty. It does require statesmanship and leadership to determine to reshape policy and to restructure an outmoded relationship. It should be noted that the coming of age of Latin American nation-states (not al! of coun;¡e, but the majority) coincides with the emergence of a series of military governments, with varyíng Ideologíes, al! authorítarian in that there is IíUle of the pluralist structure of politics that our own constitutional system represents and protects. What is important to remember, and this must be differentiated from the issue ofwhetheror not the United States "caused" the military governments now in power, is that the era of militarism heralds the arrival of the "state" in the nation-state concept. Prior to this time, the governments of Latin America have been weak. ineffectlJal decision-making units. Today. under the military in a majority of countries, or under authoritarian civilian governments such as that in Mexíco, national priorities are set by national citizens. National resources are employed in res– ponse to national programs of development. Human resources are identified and utilized in pursuit of Brazilían, Ecuadorean, or Chilean objectives. There is liUle that we can do or should do to change this state of atfairs. To recommend the adoption of such a policy does not mean that the United States and its citizens should be or are unconcerned when the emergence of a capacity to govern and to develop is accompanied by the violation of human rights and civil liberties, as has happened in a majority ofthe Latin American states. It does mean that we must be careful to sort out national policy and citízens legitimate but non-otficial response to events in Latin America. It requires the elimination of those policies.that appear to support and or streng– then governments not congruent with our own political preferences and ideals -even though we simultaneously recognize the right of other nation-states to govern themselves accordíng fo their own dictates and preferences. Thls is not the time fot the United States 10 Ihink of ways to regain the initiative we once thought we had in Latín America. That initiative brought IiUle but criticism or worse from wide segments of the peoples of Latín America and the United States. A new policy towards Latin America, which would obviously include Chile, and which would best serve the interests of the United States in the conduct of its foreign é\tfairs would emphasize the following: . 1. a reduction and eventual elimination of bilateral economic assistance; 2. an increase in legitimate multílateral social and economic assistance through existing and possibly new international institutions; 3. the reduction and possible elimination of military assistance to Latin America ~xcept in those instances in which hemispheric security is endangered. That will require the establ ishment of rigorous standards for policy-makers to preclude a series ot loopholes and exceptions. 4. the continuation of humanitarian aid; 5. a combined search, with our Latin American neighbors, for new institutional me– chanisms to mediate confl ict and foster development in the hemisphere. This will require a reexamination of the role and functioning of the O.A.S.; serious consideration should be given to movíng O.A.S. headquarters from Washington to Latin America and asking the Latin nations to bear the burden of operating costs. It must be recognized that with new and vigorous governments in Latín Ameríca, the possibilíty for ínternational conflict will íncrease although it is not inevitable. Where as the United States was able in the pastto prevent the possibility ofsuch conflict, it wíll not have that power in the future. The threat to withhold arms or economic assistance no longer deters. Latin Amerkan states have both the resources and the will to conduct an increasin– gly independentforeign policy. Under such circumstances. it would be in the best interests ofthe United States to avoíd the duplication ofthe special relatíonships ofthe past, and the expense as well, and concentrate on less "polítical" and more diplomatic suasion in accomplishing national objectives in Latin America. The adoption of an overall policy approach such as I have recommended here would have obvious and direct applícation to the state of the United States relations with Chile. 284