Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

Providi·ng this modest military assistance to Chile, I believe, would help serve U.S. interest in five areas, though the results are not always certain: 1 It would help restore Ihe military balance between Chile and Peru, tend to make WB between the two less likely, and thus contribute lO regional stability. 2. It would make the Chilean Governmenl less dependent on other external suppliers who may be unreliable or who might use military deliveries to subvert Chilean interests. It should be noted that even during the Allende years, the Chilean military refused Soviet military hardware offered on terms far more generous than those ofthe United States. 3. It would enable the Chilean Armed Forces to be more effectlve in internal civic action and humanitarian operations, especially during flood and earthquake disasters. 4. It would hel p to provide continued access of American officials to Chilean military leaders. Clear lines of communication fostered by U.S. training and advice are especially important during thisemergency period of military government. 5. Military sales would help ease the U.S. balance of payments problem. Conversely, if this military assistance is withheld for punitive and reformist reasons, Chile will consider it a serious rebuff, especially since her leaders believe that the very survival ofthe country is at stake. They would tend to feel isoiated and forsaken by their bes! friend, an attitude hardly conducive to moderate domes!ic or foreign policies. Past experience demonstrates that unilateral sanctions imposed by Ihe United States or any other power tend lo be self-defeating. They cause unnecessary resenlment, erode mutual confidence, and lay Ihe foundation for counter-sanctions. They would rightly be regarded as arrogant interference in internal affairs and would tend to create aclimate that would make the satisfactory solution of the outstanding expropriation claims and debt repayment problems with the United States more difficult. If we fail to provide U.S. military training and lo sell the modest amount of equipment Chile seeks to buy from us, the government will feel compelled to go elsewhere. And there is no assurance thal the alternative supplier will have the same respect for the integrily of Chile or the same interest in peaceful development as does the United States. For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I believe the Congress should give serious conside– ratíon to the Admínistration's modest requests for economic and mí Iitary assistance. 281