Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

8. By giving preferentíal treatment to extremist Marxist groups, including those advo– cating and using violence, the regime helped to create a clímate of politícal conflict which erupted in demonstrations, stri":es, and víolence. It is estimated that during the entire Allende period there was one v,')lent death a week attributable to political agitatíon and conflict. 9. Whether by design or ineptitude, Allende managed to bring the Chilean economyto íts knees. By various politically motiva1ed measures, including wage raíses, nationaliza– tion of large and small enterprises, including foreígn properties without compensation, the regime reduced the rate of national productivíty to near zero, reversed the favorable balance of international payments, and destroyed its creditworthiness abroad. By printing money recklessly, it produced an inflation rate in real terms of between 500 and 1,500% . Severe shortages of food, clothing, and other essentials led to strikes and demonstrations throughout the country. 10. The regime's pOlicy toward the three Armed Services was erratic, ambiva– lent, and contradictory. In late 1970, Allende signed a special const¡tutional amendment which guaranteed the independence and the integrity of the Armed Services and the Carabineros. He violated this pledge by permitting illegal armed groups to operate, by . co-opting high military officers to serve in high civilian posts in his government by the dismissal of high officers 10r political reasons, and by seeking to split and subvert the Armed Forces by political infiltration. According to documents, referred to collectively as Plan Z, there was an officially condoned Marxist design to take overthe country by violence, including the assassination 01 key officers of the Armed Forces. These ten statements dealing largely with internal matters are widely believed to be true in Chile and my observations tend to support them. The charges against the illegal behavior of the Allende regime were made public in a number of documents from Chilean leaders in 1973, including the following: 1. May 26,1973: Unanimous Supreme Court resolution denouncing the Allende re– gime's "disruption of the legalíty of the Nati6n" by its failure to uphold a Criminal Court's decision to take action to evict persons who illegally seized property. 2. June 26,1973: A second Supreme Court resolution addressed to President Allende, charging him with illegal and unconstitutional interference in legal affairs that fall "within the exclusive competence 01 the Judicial Power." 3. July 8, 1973: Joint declaration by Eduardo Frei, President of the Senate, and Luis Pareto, Pres ident 01 the Chamber of Deputies, appeal ing for the reestab Iishment of legal ity "before it is too late." The declaration emphasized the danger of civil war inherent in the regime's polícy of arming íllegal groups, the "creatíon of a parallel army ín which numerous foreigners are collaborating." 4. August 8, 1973: This declaration of the General Councíl of the Bar Association warned the public of "the collapse 01 the rule of law" in Chile and saíd the "obvíous fracturing of our legal structure can no longer betolerated." It called forthe reestablishment of rights 10r all citizens and of "fu 11 independence ofthe Judíciary Branch." 5. August 22, 1973: This declaration by the Chamber 01 Deputíes (elected in March 1973) presents a bill of particulars charging the Allende regime with a deliberate pattern of illegal and unconstitutíonal behaviour and wídespread violation 01 fundamental human . rights. 6. August 31,1973: The General Council ofthe Bar Association issued a report on the growing jurisdictional conflict between the President and the Congress, concluding that only Congress is competent to legislate and determine the extent of Presidential authority. The Allende regime fell almost wholly because of domestic reasons -its failure to cope with the economic problem, its violations ofthe Constitution and the rule of law, its inability to maintain civil peace, and its exacerbation of political tensions to the point of civil war. There is no substantial evidence to índicate that the regime was weakned, much less 275