Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

the "illusion that we could re-make other continents" and the attitude that "we knew what was best for everyone else."(3) In his 1970 State of the Union message, he said: "The nations in each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their OW(1 well-being" and "they themselves should determine the terms of that well-being." Internal development, in this view, is the primary responsibility 01 each state, and international security is the responsibility of all states, in accordance with their capacity to influence externa I events. "We therefore deal realistically," he added in 1972, "with governments as they are -right and left. We have strong preferences and hopes to see free democratic processes prevail, but we cannot impose our political structure on other nations."(4) Affirming the strong American commitment to democracy and human rights which we all share, Secretaryof State William Rogers said: "Butthe choice, except as it applies to our own country, is not ours to make. It would be the ultimate arrogance of power to think that we can or should impose our will on others -to threaten or coerce others, even in the name of conscience."(5) These more relaxed and compassionate views toward the internal policies of friendly Third World governments have generally prevailed in the Congress and the administration, but the minority reformist view has been sufficiently persistent to complicate the policy debate on both economic and military assistance. It has had a direct bearing on the critería for determining when to start or terminate particular U.S. aid programs and has tended to introduce an extraneous element into the process of evaluating the utility of military assistance efforts. The reformist view has also complicated development aid by insisting that it should be used as a weapon of internal political change. Economic or military assistance can be justified only if it contributes to U.S. objectives in Latin America. This means that military aid should be judged primarily by its impact on regional stability and development assístance by its impact on the productivity of the state that receives il. The United States has a strong interest in regional stability in Latín America because local mílitary conflict could expand and thus upset the regional balance or even lead to big-power involvement and thus threaten strategic stability. Whilethis chain of events is not likely, small wars such as the one between El Salvador and Honduras exacerbate tensions, waste scarce resources, and otherwise slow up peaceful and constructive economic and political development. Chile must be seen in this larger contexl. As a member of the Andean group, it is' importan! that she remain at peace with her large and small neighbors. That peace is potentially threatened by the growing military might of Chile's historie enemy, Peru, which is being heavily armed by the purchase 01 Soviet armor and other weapons. A week ago, on July 29, in the Peruvian Independence Day parade, 54 Soviet T-55 tanks, with 1aa-MM guns were shown, along with three batteries 01 Yugoslav 105-MM howitzers, 8 truck-mounted surface-to-air missiles, and olher missile-support equipment. Peru also has 60 M-4 Sherman medium lanks, and 100 AMX-13 French tanks with 105-MM guns. In contrast, Chile's 76 M-4 Sherman tanks are no match. Informed observers believe Peru has or wi I1 soon have al least a five-to-one superiority in armor over that of Chi le. And an increasing percentag~ of this Peruvian armor and otherweapons will be coming from the Soviet Union. With this indisputed superiority, Peru may well be templed to attack Chile to recover the territory it lost to Chile in lhe 1878-83 war, possibly with the encouragement of Moscow. Chile understandably has been apprehensive about this situation and has been seeking to develop a defense posture that will deter an attack from Peru. The problem was (3)Address. Oclober 31, 1969. published as Action for Progress for the Amerícas. Deparlment 01 State. November 1969. pp. 1 and 2. (4)U.S. Foreign Po/icyfor the /970s: The Emerging Structure ofPeace. AReporttotheCongress by RicharNixon, President 01 lhe Uniled States. February 9. 1972. p. 96. (5)Quoled in Ihe Washington Post. August 25, 1972. 273