Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

According to Chart 3, the investments considered in the program would involve the following totals: Infrastructure Production Social (Expressed in mOlions of USS equivalents) Local currency 2.583.5 1.616.2 2.010.0 6.409.7 .Foreign currency 970,8 1.814.9 162,0 2.947,7 Total . 3.631.1 2,172,0 9.357.4 If we remember that the amount of investment covers the next five or six years and if we take into account that the annual gross national proouct of Chile is close to 8 bi 1I ion, we may conclude that such an investment represents between 15 and 18 percent of the GNP of Chile. depending on whetherthe period considered Is five or six years. Evidently. the goals hardest to attain are those of the first years. since major foreign aid will be required. In the final analysis. this means that the program)n general must be regarded as a six-year program, This'figure is very close to reality if one considE!rs that it Is the time estimated for the more important investments. . The fundamental observation should be the positive E!ffect this program has on the foreign currency resources of Chile, This has been presented in Chart 4, which shows that if the program is fully implemented. the country will be able to rely on an additional amount of foreign currency. This amount will be approxi mately $ 2.6 billion. of which $ 930 mili ion will become available as a result of reduced imports, The balance -slightly less than $ 1.66 billion- would be provided by newexports. It is obvious that these new exports, in turn, imply greater imported input requirements. However, on balance, the production of expor– table goods and services willshow a considerable net gain. In order to appreciate the margin involved, it should be sufficient to remember that a substantial part of the foreign currency would be provided by agriculture (850 million) and copper (770 million). In the presentations made by Chile on this matter, the country has always stated a very conservative figure. In fact, it has only referred to 1.5 billion in newforeigr; currency. Such a modest estimates is due to the uncertaintyregarding the speed of the program and the market and price for copper. However, it should be remembered th.at at ar')ytime after 1980, Chile can put into operation a new, highly profitable copper mine. with a production potéritial of 300.000 tons peryear. Therefore, the nation could enjoyan additional income of more than $ 450 mili ion. 247