Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

argued that no one, least of al! the proletariat, was obliged to obey Chile's current constitu– tional order; and tha! it was necessary "to impose a popular dictatorship" because it was the bourgeoisie itselfthat had broken the rules ofthe game, Le" the frustrated June 29, 1973 coup by Souper: ...the installation of a popular dictatorship will make it possible to break the shell of bourgeoisie institutionality and to achieve assoon as possible the fulfillment of the entire program of the Unidad Popular.(81) , In spite of the extreme Left's calls for the destruction of Chilean democracy and installation of a Marxist dominated dictatorship, the Communist party of Chile continued to speak out against the extremists' calls for a violent revolution, From the very beginning of Allende's term the Communists saw very clearly that the violent road to power was not and never would be a viable alternative to the peaceful road to socialism in Chile. For example, in November. 1970, soon after Allende took office, ,Luis Corvalán, Secretary General of the Communist party, said in a speech that groups like the Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucio– nario only "do damageto the popular cause with their preaching against elections. against an understanding with the Radicals and in favorof an armed struggle..."(82) The Commu– nists knew that as long as the military was united in its insistence upon being the protectors of the constitutional order, only by acting generally within the bounds of the Constitution could their ever hope to achieve power. What this sharp difference in opinion between the two major parties in the Unidad Popular coalition did was lo create an open splil wilhin Ihe Marxist ranks that the opposition was able to point to as evidence Ihat Allende could not control the'extremists within his own coalition. It was easy to conclude. therefore. that he was not capable of governing Chile according to its constitutíon.(83) Another problem partly related lo the antagonisms within the Marxist camp was Ihe struggle for positions of power and prestige by all six parties within the government. Since it was assumed Ihal each party brought a certain percentage of electoral support with it lo the coalition, a quota system was instituled by the Unidad Popular wereby each party was assigned ministerial and other governmental positions approximately in proportion lo their electoral weight as reflected in the most recent elections. Thus, Allende's first 15 member cabinet appointed on November 3, 1970 contained 4 Socíalists; 3 Com'munists; 3 Radicals; 2 Social Democrats; 1 Independent Popular Action; 1 Mapucista; and 1 Independent.(84) The same basic distribution pattern was reflected within the lower bureaucratic hierar– chies as well, The problem that arose almost immediately with this system, however, was that the vertical chain of command often broke down due to ídeological or personal disputes. Often a Communist bureaucrat would refuse to carry out the directives of his Socialist superior because of a difference of opinion between their respective parties on certain issues. Norwas this conflict limited to lower echelon positions, since on at least one occasion the Socialist party ordered two of its ministers to resign from the cabinet or be expelled from the party in a dispute wilh Allende over a policy issue,(85) In addition, the patronage politics of the Allende regime resulted in numerous political (81)Ibid, (82)Luis Corvalán, Camino de Victoria (Santiago de Chile: Sociedad Impresora Horizonte, 19711, p. 399, (83)Soon after the overthrow 01 Allende, the Italian Communist party heId a meeting in Rome to analyze the reasons lor his downlall. As the Italians viewed it, two 01 the major reasons lor Allende's lailure were the actions ofthe extreme left elements 01 Allende's own party, principally Senator Carlos Altamirano and his association with the extremist Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), and the lailure 01 the Unidad Popular to reach a working alliance with the Chriatian Democrats, See Economist Foreign Report, Oc!ober, 1973, pp. 6-7. . (84)Bolsa Review, Vol. IV (December, 1970), p, 690. Radomiro Tomic in an interview in Santiago, Chile. July 13, 1973 talked 01 the quota system lor government jObs, (85)ij was widely rumored !ha! a major cause of the mililary withdrawal lrom the cabine! in early 1973 and a condition 01 their return in July, 1973 was thatthey be given !he powerto name their own subordinates and not haveto conlront political opposition in carrying out administrative tasks, See alsoEI Libro Blanco (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Lord Cochrane, 1974). 198