Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after
economic leverage led increasingly to the belief among opposition parties that the Marxists were playing a Machiavellian game with Chile's socio-economic and political institutions in order to entrench themselves permanently-in power. Allende began making public statements that seemed to bear out the charges of the anti-Marxists that the Unidad Popular would not respect Chile's constitution, regardless of any guarantees. For example, three months following his election Allende said in a speech in the port city of Val paraíso "... 1 am the President of the·Unidad Popular.:. I am not the President of all Chileans... ," while at the same time in an interview with Régis Debray he said thatthe UnidadPopular had agreed to the constitutional guarantees as a tactical maneuver since tRe important thing at the time had been to take control of the government.(71) Further, at the same time that Allende was making these statements the government began to shift emphasis away from the socio-economic reforms for which there was broad-based support -'such as the nationalization of copper, lowering of unemployment and inflation, and agrarian reform- toward more controversial changes such as constitutio– nal reformo Coupled with Allende's own statements about "tactical maneuvers," the opposi– tion saw the use of "legal loopholes" outlined earlier to take over private enterprises and talk of strLlctural reform as merely a plot bythe Left to establish a "dictatorship of the proletariat."(72) . • Finally, the worsening economic situation outlined earlier also brought about accusa– tions that the Unidad Popular's economic pOlicies were leading Chile to ruinand dictator– ship. Wide publicity was given to oppositionspeculation that the Marxists had deliberately intended to destroy Chile's "bourgeoisie econemy" in ari efforti:irdestroyirig the economic power base of those groups most opposed to the Unidad Popular: the wealthy and middle classes. Within ayear following Allende's election, the Christian Democrats were accusing the Unidad Popular of "a failure in economic policy" due to "delirious ideological dogma– tism" that was inciting "sectarianism, violence, illegality, and hatred" in the country.(73) The combination of pubLic statements such as those by Allende and oth.ér members of the Unidad Popular, the shift in emphasis in reform measures, and a deteriorating economic situation lent credence to those who had questioned the extend to which the Marxists could be trusted to obey Chile's democratic norms. At the same time, it gave conservatives within the Christian Democratic party an obvious advantage when they argued that only by making common cause with the Right against Allende could a total take-over. by the Marxists be prevented. A second and perhaps most important reason for the end of the governmenr"honey– moon" was the resultant change in position of the Christian Democratic party. Within ayear after Allende's election the party switched from following Tomic and his supporters who pushed for cooperation with the Unidad Popular to being controlled by that faction which was most opposed to and suspicious ofthe Marxist government. After Allende's election the Christian Democrats had found themselves in a peculiar position. As en opposition party they had always been cast in the role of progressives and revolutionaries because-they were attacking right-wing governments. Now, however, the party was cast in the role of opposition to a left-wing government that would inevitably cast the Christian Democrats i." the role of being conservative.(74) By the time of the December, 1970junta meeting of the Christian Democrats, two clear factions had emerged with regard to resolving this di– lemma. One faction represented by Frei wanted to take a Ílery cautious if not opposition line (71)Régis Debray. rhe Chilean Revolution: Conversations With Al/ende '(New York: Random House Vintage Book. 1971), PP. 119-120. See also Hernán Millas and Emilio Filippi. Crónica de una Experiencia (Santiago, Chile: Zig-Zag, 1974), pp. 23-24. . .. (72)Charges against the Allende administration lor having deliberately sabotaged the economy in order to destroythe middle class and institute political control through rationing were made by opposilion newspapersalmost daily, especially near the time 01 the March, 1973Congressional élections. See El Mercurio, December 14, 1972, p. 21: and January 14, 1973, p. 37. See also Que Pasa, May 10, 1973, pp. 10:14. (73)LaTercera de la Hora, October 21,1971, p. 5. . (74)Clarín, November 1.3, 1970, p. 5. 195
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