Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

responsible forcarrying out numerous subversive and illegal acts in attempting to prevent and later overth row the Allende government, the most well known bei ng the abortive coup of June 29, 1973 that was led by Coronel Souper.(66) In spite of the exteme nature of the Right's actions following Allende's election, however, they did more to discredit their own position than build any popular sentiment against thé Unidad Popular. In contrast to the Right's plotting to prevent Allende's election and the Marxist threats of c iviI war and violence, the Ch ri stian Democrats acted fi rmly to mai ntai n Ch ile's democratic stability. As the real power brokers in Congress who held Allende's fate in their hands, the party calmed the Left by making it clear that they intented to vote for.Allende. However, at the sam.e time, the Christian Democrats allayed the fears of those suspicious of the Marxists by saying that the party had libiñféntion of voting for Allende unconditionally. The Christian Democrats made it clear to the newly elected Marxist coalition that theywould require some sor! of guarantees that Chi le's democratic traditions would be respected in exchange for their support. One ofthe first alternatives p'resel)ted to Allende by the Christian Democrats was the request that the party be giv~o.some high level cabinet positions. This option was quite willingly considered by-Alleiíd e but was firmly rejected by the rest of the Unidad Popular coalition, particularly under the influence of the extreme left-wing Socialist faction headed up by Carlos Altamirano. Thus, as pOinted out in the beginning ofthis chapter, what was finally agreed upon as a guarantee was a series of constitutional amendments which were little more than explicit affirmations of what was already basically guaranteed by the Chilean constitution.(67) Although there was general agreement among Christian Democrats concerning the demanded guarantees, lhe party's debates after the fact on whether to accept them once again illustrated that the Christian Democrats were stiJl not entirely united. The Oficialistas, led principally by spokesman Patricio Aylwin, did not believe that the Marxists could be trusted and wanted more than an amendment to the Constitution which they viewed as something which could be too easily violated at some future date. On the other hand, lhe Christian Democratic left insisted that the Communists were merely "Chileans who wanted only the best for the country."(68) . In spite of any differences there may have been within the Christian Democratic party over approving the guarantees, by the time of the swearing-in ceremonies,most Christian Democrats had become reconciled along with most other Chileans to "give Allende a· chance." Senator Patricio Aylwin, perhaps the best known spokesman forthe more conser– vative faction within the Christian DemoCratic party, said tllat the party would bea "Ioyal opposition: " We will not do with Dr. Allende nor with the Unidad Popular what they did to our (Freí) government: to deny us salt and water. We wi II be a construclive opposition thal wi 11 se'rV~ to-. reaffirm our party's characler... "(69) Eveh the director of the conservative Santiago daily El Mercurio, tha! had supported Alessandri in the election, was reported to have said "the newspaper is willing to support change in Chile's property structure and social relations such as Dr. Allende propo- ses."(70) . However, this "honeymoon" period between lhe Unidad Popular and opposition· groups was short-Iíved for two general reasons. First, lhe pubiíé'utterances ofAllende coupled with the Unidad Popular's attempts al consolidaling iheir polítical power lhrough' {66lSee El Tancazo de Ese 29 de Junio, no publisher or dale given. This documenl was prinled by Ihe Unidad Popular governmenl and soId al newstands around Chile seon after the attemped coup of June 29, 1973. (67)Chile C.onstituci6n, capítulo 111. (68)Radomjro Tomic. interview in Sanliago, Chile, July 13, 1973. (69)La Segunda, Oclober 23;.1970, p. 8.· . (70)QuolEjd in Peter Camejo, "Popular Fronlism in OHice: The Firsl Year", in Disaster in Chile,. ed. by Les Evans (New York: Palhfinder Press. 1974), pp. 4344. 194