Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

increases. The majorresponse ofthe government tothis dilemma. in addition to seekíng aid from countríes sympathetic to íts policíes, was to speed up the prínting presses as money in circulation once agaín more than doubled between November, 1971 and November, 1972 (Table 10). The result was an ínflation that reached 180 percent by December, 1972, and increasing economic chaos and a black market that made government attempts at price controls fruitless.(32) . Allende's pOlicy of speeding up agrarian reforrn also had negative results in the countryside. In Tables 7 through 9 it can be seen that after the 1970-71 harvest planted mostly under Frei, production began to decline. As is evident in Table 8, for example, by 1973, Chílean agriculture was producing less of what it needed of every major agricultural commoditythan it had in 1970. The importation offoodstuffs thus jumped from 168mili ion to 600 mili ion dollars peryear by 1973.(33) In addition to producing a sharp drop in agricultu– ral production, the drastically accelerated rate of agrarian reform under Allende also contributed to producing numerous instances of socio-economic havoc in the countryside as extremist groups such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) encoura– ged peasants to occupy lands illegally.(34) Massive expropriation also often met with both resistance and non-cooperation from landholders, many of whom charged that theír land was being expropriated for pOlitical rather than economic reasons. These landholders therefore often attempted to sabotage the government's expropriation efforts by selling off or slaughtering livestock and refusing to plant crops for the following year in which they were to be expropriated.(35) Peasants also became rapidly disenchanted with the Unidad Popular's agrarian reform program as they began to realize that the government had no intention of giving them title to the land that they had been promised. Instead the govern– ment intended to create state farms for which the peasant would continue to work much as he had done for the old patrón.(36) In general, the reaction against many of the Unidad Popular's strategies for expropria– tion began to spread into the middle and even to some degree into the lower classes. Resistance and non-cooperation soon became manifest in the industrial, commercial, and transportation sectors of the economy as the Unidad Popular increasingly used quasi-Iegal means of expropriating or intervening in any enterprise that could not or would not meet the government's demands.(37) By October, 1972, agricultural and industrial production had both fallen drastically. many basic foods and durable goods were difficult to obtain, and inflation stood at about 115 percentforthe year. AII ofthis created an increasingly polarized political situation characterized by mounting resistance to the government. The result was a 23 day general strike that cost the country an estimated 100 million dollars and was solved only after the military agreed to enter Allende's cabinet.(38) (32}The inflationary spiral resulted in a dual price system. Le" officíal and black market. Mosl Ihings unavailable atthe offícíal príce could be boughl al anywhere from twice lo ten limes whalwas supposed lo be Ihe legal maximum Ihal could be charged. For example. people seJlíng door lo door would olten arrive al my apartmenl offering everything from freshly ki lIed chickens lo loolhpasle. The dollar also broughl len limes Ihe officíal exchange rate if sold 01'1 Ihe black market. (33)Figures are from Andrés Bianchi. publíc leclure al Ihe Universily ofTexas al Auslin. February 19.1973. For 1974 il was estimated Ihal food imports would reach alleasl 700 miJlion .dollars. Sea "Chile", Quarterly Economic Review o[London. N.O 1 (March. 1974). p. 1. (34)See Table 18 for the slatislics 01'1 agrarian reform. For information concerníng Ihe impacl in Ihe counlryside of Ihe Unidad Popular's agrarian reformo see Johnson. "The Chil~an Road lo Socialism". pp. 248-268; The Chilean ECOflomy Under the Popular Uflity Government, p. 25; Qu/Pasa, Aprill2'. 1973. pp. 40-41. and March 8. 1973. p. 37; and Ercüta, March 21-27.1973, pp. 16-18. (35)1 spoke lo a number of farmers who djd exactly whal I have described. {36)According lo one source. during Allende'~ firsl year in ollice 1'101 one peasant received tille lo a parcel of land. The Chilean Economy Uflder the Popular Uflity Governmeflt, p. 25. {37)For some Of Ihe conlroversy surrounding Ihe expropriation of businesses and induslry see Qut Pasa. Oclober 19.1972. pp. 12-15. and February 15,1973, p. 7. See also El Mercurio. November 9.1972, pp. 15-17; December 24. 1972, p. lO; and May 17.1973, pp. 5 and 21. (38)The figure of 100 millíon dollar;' was quoled by Salvador Allende in a radío and television speech, Oclober 24. 1972. 188