Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

complete suspension of all polítical activity, the restrictions on existing trade-union organi– zations, military intervention in universities and similar acts all contributed to the sense of shock felt by many people, tha! one of the few states in the world where sueh events were thought to be higly unlíkely, if not indeed impossible, should undergo this traumatic experience. Why, then, did it happen? Why should the armed forces take drastic action against a constitutionally-elected regime, and particularly one with which thelr high-ranking repre– sentatives had cooperated in lts three years in power? And what are the philosophy and aims of the present military government? To answer these questions, it m<[ly not be enough to consider the course of Chilean events under Allende alone, crucial though they were as proximate causes of the intervention. Equally important, a good deal of light can be !hrown on the contemporary Chilean situation and what produced it by looking a little more closely at the accepted view of the country's institutional stability, not to deny its general validity ':"and particularly in comparison with most other Latin American states, and many in.Asia and Africa as well- but simply to question some of its assumptions. For, as it happened, it was precisely becaUse Allende's government and, much more rashly, extremist groups outside p'olitics made quite unwarranted assumptions about Chilean history, behaviour afId institutions that both were overthrown. Among those institutions were the armed torces. THE ARMED FORCES AND POLITICS Charged with the basic national duty of defence against external altack, with questions of internal security falling largely to the carabineros the Chilean armed forces are thoroughly professional. Yet there have been occassions in modern Chilean history when military elements, large or small, havé intervened in politics: the success of only two of these interventions between 1831 and 1973 has obscured the fact that other attempts were made, though usually by particular groups and not by the armed forces as a whole. While historical analogíes should not be pushed too far, and both successful military interven– tions in Chile's p'ast had their own complex causes and results which cannot be detailed here, they are relevant to the situation in 1973, as brief reference will show. The first occasion, in 1891, sáw the Chilean navy, though not the army, ally with a majority in Congress against President Balmaceda, whose clearly unconstitutional beha– viour and alleged attempts to create a dictatorship led to civil war, and Balmaceda's defeat and suicide. Then, in 1924 and 1925, the armed forces intervened again, against a background of political breakdown and economic chaos, and a military junta élssumed power to clean up the mess. As in 1891, intervention came after political interference with the military on behalf of sectional ínterests. On both these occasions, and in 1973, those who acted did so both with fuI! awareness of Chilean tradition and of the Constitution, and with an even firmer conviction that if they di.dnot act the consequences for the nation would be disastrous. In other words, however strong the tradition of military obedience to civilian authority, that obedience could never be completely unconditional: it depended on civilian authority itself, the policies it'pursued and the way it pursued them. And here, the compari– son between 1924 and 1973 is quite striking. Both interventions occurred in an atmosphere of national uncertainty, created by economic and polítical collapse; but evenmore remar– kable is the similarity ofthe tone and terms of the manifesto issued by the junta to t.hat pronounced by its predecessor almost half a century before. As in 1924, it was a harsh indictment of political failure and economic mismanagement and, by a truly remarkable coincidence, both manifestos were issued on the same date, 11th September. Hístory may not repeat itself, but hístorical situations recur: unfortunately, it is not on Iy those who refuse to learn from history who suffer the conseqúences of their neglect. Another example ofthís truism relates to the questions of foreigners in Chile in 1973. It is perfectlytrue that Chile has long accepted political refugees as welcome guests, but this tradition, again, could never be unconditional. Here the condition was obvíous: foreign refugees should not interfere in Chilean politics. This tradition, too! was eroded: Chile 16