Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

and there was wide-spread sentiment lor nationalization both in Congress and among the populace at large, thus presenting no problem ln accomplishing this aspect 01 the pro– gramo In spíte 01 these seemingly lavorable legal-institutional and polítical circumstances, the Allende lorces lelt they could work only up to a point within Chile's traditional legal system since the actual constitutional arrangement was considered to be an obstacle to the complete implementation 01 a true socialist state. Therelore, a major goal 01 the Unidad Popular was to lorge the necessary majority support lor approving a new socialist constitu– tion that would be submitted lo the people in a plebiscile.(11) Many people bolh within and oulside 01 the Unidad Popular coalition doubted whether the lar reaching changes envisio– ned by Allende and his strategy lor carrying them out could be implemented without resorting lo violence and/or destroying Chile's democracy.(12) Allhough ultímalely they were proven correct, duríng Allende's lirst year in ollice, his program appeared almost brilliantly succeslul. Allende gambled Ihat regardless 01 the long range economic conse– quences 01 hís policies, the short range poi ilical benelits would be sufficient to withstand any attacks by the opposition while he built the necessary support lor his new constitution and entrenched the Marxists lirmly in power. Paradoxically, however, the reasons lor the Unidad Popular's early successes were also the reasons lor its ultimate lailure. In the long run, the strategy failed when the suppart generated by Allende's policies lell short 01 expectations and the economic plans drove Ihé country deep into economic chaos, resulting in the bloody coup 01 September 11, 1973. The Unidad Popular economic strategywas aimed at accomplishíng two over-al! goals -the fírst beíng a necessary precondition lor the second- on the way to building the "peaceful r.oad to socialism." Initially, through a series 01 economic measures which would benelit the lower classes the mosto Allende hoped to buíld a broad coalition 01 majority suppórt lor his programs in order to, secondly, implement the classic socialist policy 01 state control over the most important areas 01 the country's socio-economic and political lile. By using the legal-inslilutional means at his disposal, he planned lo imniediately undertake a program 01 income redistríbulion; lo reduce unemployment; lower the rate 01 ínllation to 10 percent per year within 12 months; expand industrial output by between 25-30 percent; speed up agrarían relorm; and ínitíate a crash program 01 housing construc– tion.(13) Allende's original Minister 01 Economy, Marxíst Pedro Vuskovic, argued tha! "income redistri butíon" could best be brought about by grantíng huge wage boosts to the lowest income groups in Chile. As lor the possible inllationary effects 01 such a move, Vusk.ovic argued that such an increase, farlrom creating inllationary demand would merely stimulate Waller Pr¿ss, 1973}. p. 22. For an opposite view ól the Unidad Popular government's tacHes see The Chilean Economy Under the Popular Unity Government (Santiago de Chile: Impreso Edilora Nacional Gabriela Mislral, 1974). For a sample 01 some 01 Ih'e conlroversy and legal baltles surrounding Ihe Unidad Popular's maneul/ers lo place Ihe mosl powerful and valuable seclors 01 Ihe economy under state control see El Mercurio, December 24, 1972, p. 10; NOl/ember9, 1972, pp. 15-17; December2. 1972, p. 27. See also Qu;Pasa, October 19,1972, pp. 12-16; and Chile Hoy, June 1-7, 1973, pp. 5-6; April 19-26, 1973, pp. 15-17. (11 }For a summation 01 Allende's proposed articles 01 revision see, Femando Silva Sánchez, ed., Conslitución Chilena, Texto Oficial Actualizado (Valparaíso, Chile: By Ihe Author, Casilla4 78, 1972), pp. 51-69. For a description 01 Ihe "new Chile" Ihal the Allende programs wen¡¡ 10 bring aboul see Farnsworth and olhers, New Chile, pp. 130-142. (12)For example, el/en wilhin Allende's own Socialisl party, the exlremisltaction led by Carlos Altamirano argued Ihal Ihere could never be concilíalion nor coexislence wilh the opposition, only tolal viclory. See Carlos Allamirano, Decisión Revolucionaria (Santiago, Chile: Editora Nacional Quimanlú, 1973). Certain Marxisl dominated unions also proclaimed Ihal Ihey were nol bound lo acl wilhin Ihe conslrainls 01 "bourgeoisie legalily." See Chile Hoy, June 8-14, 1973. (13)Prolessor Paul Rosenslein-Rodan, "Rehabilitaling the Post-Allende Economy ot Chile," a public lecture at Ihe University 01 Texas al Auslin, March 18, 1974; and Protessor Andrés Bianchi, a publiC lecture al Ihe Universily 01 Texas al Austin, February 19, 1974. For more about economic policy under Allende see Dale Johnson, ed., The Chilean Roadto Socialism (New York: Anchor Press, 1973), pp. 410473. 165