Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

wíth the Allende Government. They urged the míddle class opposítion partíes to press the mílitary to "Ieave the barracks" and topple the hopeful socialist experiment. Such simplístic and fantastic "explanations" of the complex Chilean polítical process that led to the popular revolt against the Allende regíme and its removal from office are not uncommon in the growing literature of the Allende years, In this literature, there is liUle mentíon of the fact that Allende systematícally violated the constitution, tacítly encou,raged the íllegal movements of weapons into Chile, armed the ultra-Ieft for theír clearly illegal and sometimes violent seizure of farms and factoríes; that Allende politically polarized the Chilean nation, preached class hatred and attempted to destroy the economíc prosperity and livelíhóod of the large Chilean míddle class; that Allende's policíes culmínated in galloping inflation, political anarchy, chronic strikes, physícal ínsecurity, rationing of essentials, shortages of spare parts and equipment, official black market profiteering, and increasing political violence. By the end of August 1973, the majority of the Chilean people -most students, intelec~ tuals, professionals, technicians, the large lower middle and míddle classes and many workers and Popular Unity supporters- had become alienated and were calling for the resignation of lhe Allende Government. The military moved only after the government had been declared íllegal by the Supreme Court, the Congress and the Bar Association, when a clear popular mandate to intervene became evident and elements of Allende's own Socia– list Party and the ultra-Ieft were discovered to be inciting rebellion within the armed forces. The allegation that the reduction in U.S. economic aid and multilateral development assistance -and the expenditure of $7 mili ion by the CIA during the 1970 election cam– paign and the Allende years- contributed in some significant way to the overthrow of the Allende Government will nol stand up under critical scrutiny. It implies a touching faith in the potency of U.S, and multilateral development aid in preserving Latin American econo– mic and social stability and in the effectiveness of covert Agency operations which are, of course, offset by the well-known financial support given to Chilean political parties, and publications bythe USSR and Cuba and some Western European countries. Furthermore, it carries the implication that countries like Chile lack an independent polítical and economic life of their own and can be manipulated at will-which is demonstrably fal~e, Moreover, it reflects an outmoded paternalistic aUitude toward Latin America and an illusion of Ameri– can omnipotence-an illusion that survives from an earlier period of American history. U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CHILE An examinatíon of U.S. economic relations with Chile during the Allende years de– monstrates that official U.S. policy had little or no effect on the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in Chile which instead can be traced to the disastrously inept economic policies of the Allende Government. Contrary to popu lar impression, the Un ited States did not cut off all of its bi lateral aid or suspend aid disbursements to the Allende Government, which wou Id have been the case if the U.S. Government had pursued the policy of relentless hostility which is so often attributed to i1. U.S. bilateral aid (ArO, Peace Corps, PL-480 and Ex-1m Bank) obviously declined during the Allende years-a process which had already begun during the last years of the Frei Government. U.S, aid decreased from $289.6 mili ion during 1968-70 to $41.3 million. IBRO and 10B credits also declined from $124.9 million in 1968-70to$11.6 mili ion under the Allende Governmen1. U.S. bilateral aíd and multilateral aid reductions did lead to a loss of credits to Chile valued at $361,6 mí(lion, assuming that credit authoriza– tions in 1971-73 would have remained at the level prevaifing ín 1968-70, the lastthree years of the Freí Governmen1. However, the decline in U.S. aid, Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees, World Bank and 10B financial assistance received by the Allende regime in 1971-73 was more than compensated by the impressive increase in the economic aid and credits that Chile 157