Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

1971, "As for the bourgeois state at the present moment, we are seeking to overcome il. To overthrow it. "(1) The means would be the radical transformation of the Chilean Constitution through the legal device of the plebiscite. Mass mobilization, the infiltration of Chilean institutions, and tactital alliances with the opposition were to be employed to generate sufficient popular support. Congress was to be replaced by a "popular assembly" and the independent judiciary by "popular tribunals." President Allende's pledge to uphold the Statute of Guarantees (designed lO commil his government lo preserve Chile's demócratic freedoms and instilutions in excharige for Congressional support for his election lo the presidency) was simply a "Iactical necessity" to gain power and not to be taken seríously, as he explained later to Debray.(2) Therefore, during the first stage of the Chilean revolution, Allende hoped to win the majoríty supporl n~eded to call a referendum and push through a new Constitutíon that would elimínate parliament and the exísting courts. But after the April 1971 municipal elections, in' which he narrowly failed to win a majority, Allende's popularity began to decline. He now realized he could not gain the votes in a plebiscite to overturn Chile's constitution and parliamentary democracy by peaceful, legal means. Allende never had the courage to face the voters in a'plebiscite, and the failure to gain a majority in the March 1973, election made it abundantly clear that the peaceful plebiscitary path to sócialism would not work. The economic pOlicy of the Allende Government led to economic expansion during 1971, but during 1972 and 1973, plunged the economy into the worst crisis in Chilean hístory. The massive wage·íncreases, the disorderly state takeover of private firms, the appointment of incompetent party officials to key technical and administrative posts in the nationalized industries, price controls that led to a profit squeeze and bankruptcies of private firms, the illegal, sometimes violent takeover of small farms and factories, the undermining of labor discipl ¡ne by granting time offfor political activities, and the irrespon– sible expansion of the money supply led to a sharp decline in investment, output and productivity in Chile's industry and agriculture, and a Weimer-type inflation with consumer prices rising 734 percent during the first nine months of 1973(3) plus an exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, a sharp rise in food imports and finally food rationing, and shortages of all kinds of consumer and industrial goods. In the rush to transform Chile into a Marxist socialist state (which meant undermining the economíc base of the middle class, and bringing the economy under central control and directíon), the Allende Goverment seized over 500 private companies and loaded them with patronage appointees. Routine plant maintenance wa.s forgotlen, the labor force became politicized, and foreign exchange was unavailable for spare parts or needed new equipment. A similar situation prevailed in the countryside. The legacy of Allende's mis– management and decapitalizatio(l of the Chilean economy, I might add, will take half a decade or more to repair. Politically the Allende regime generally opposed revolutionary violence because the "correlation of domestic and international forces" was unfavorable-that is, the oPPosition was too strong and the armed forces and national police were not under Marxist control. Allende did not completely rule oUt the possibility of resortíng to the armed struggle, but hoped that it could be avoided under Chilean conditíons. His disagreement with the ultra-Ieft, especially the MIR which favored revolutionary violence, was tactical. Therefore by the summer of 1973, Allende became convinced that lhe armed struggle, the violent seizure of power, was the only way open since he realized the vía chilena or constitutional path to power had failed. The socialism whích the Allende regime aimed at imposing on the Chilean people was not any new "humane" democratic socialism. Itwas the old totalitarían socialism with which 154 (1 )Régis Debray, The Chiieall Revolution. Conversations with Allende (New York: Random House, 1971) p. 82. (2)lbid. p. 119. (3)IMF, Balance 01 Paymellts Yearbook, Seplember, 1974.