Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

Therefore, "U.S. representatives within Ihe Inter-American Development Bank, reacling lo threats lo reduce or withhold U.S. funds lo (the) JOB because·of its willingness lo listen to Chilean requesls for development loan funding, have 'delayed' Chilean requests (which has Ihe same effecl as an overt denial). "(11) NACLA analysts contE!nd Ihat the multi lateral banks stopped lending lo Chile bécause Chilean agencies previously slaffed by middle– class Christian Democralic functionaries whom the instilutions favored became staffed by socialísts and communists once Allende assumed power, and thebanks did not wish to further Iheir enemy's advances by lending him money.(12) So long as Chile pursued a policy of nalionalization and expropriation, the banks would reject loan proposals lo Ihat country, NACLA researchers contended, since it is the purpose of the World Bank and IDB to promote development within the framework of private capilalism and to promote favora– ble investmenl climales in developing counlries.(13) Other analysts who have studied the Chilean situation dispute the contention that the banks were used by the United States as a tool in economic warfare against the Allende government. Notwithstanding his statement (quoted aboye) that U.S. influence hampered IDB consideration of Chile loans, Sigmund generally downplays the contention that the banks were used as instruments of U.S. policy or that the U.S. Government in fact tried to use international financial pressures to effect the collapse of the Allende regime.(14) In a lelter to Foreign Policy,(15) Edward Jamison charges that Petras and La Porte's contentions are "replete with superficiality, halftruths and conclusions based on inadequate evidence," In another lelter, A.C. Weed, 11 (a former assistant to the U.S. Executive Director, World Bank) states that this article "makes certain serious errors of fact, an occasional gross misinterpretation of what has gone into the decision-making process, and suffers from a lack of bafance."(16) He vigorously disputes the contention that the banks have been "more appendages of the U.S. Government," and denies the suggestions that the World Bank used non-economic criteria in determining Chile's credit-worthiness. David Holden depre– cates the whole argument thal the United States was successful in employing it to destroy the Allende government This "emerging myth" must be knocked down al every turn, he argues, for "it seems to me that the idea of an American conspiracy to overthrow Allende is both unproven and unnecessary to explain his downfall. "(17) Like most authors who dispute the basic contention that Allende was the viclim of international economic warfare or that the U.S. Government actively sought his demise through this means, Holden does not find it necessary to dispute the subsidiary charge thatthe banks were used as one tool of such international economic pressure. The multilateral development banks have vociferously denied that their lending opera– tions towards Chile have been in any way influenced by political considerations or by the foreign policy objectives of any national government. Lending decisions in Ihe case of Chile have been reached stric;tly according lo the economic merits of the situation and the developmental potential of specific project proposals, bank spokesman argue, and Cl1i– lean socialism and expropriations have had no effect on the loan operations of the interna– tional inslitulions. World Bank President Robert McNamara responded directly to Ambassador Cubillo's remarks, disagreeing with the argument that his institution had done anything improper in its relations with Chile. McNamara told the ECOSOC session that Sr. Cubillos was wrong (11)lbid., p. 137. (12)Elizabeth Farnsworth, Richard Feinberg, and Eric Leenson, Chile: Facing the Blockade. North American Congress on Latín America's Latín America and Empire Report, vol. VII, January 1973: 18. (13)lbid., p, 19, . (14}Sigmund. The Fall 01 Allende, pp. 327-9, 332,337-8 (15}Edward Jamison. Letter 10 the edilors, Foreign Policy, N,o 8, Fa11 1972: 156-8, Jamison lives in Eau.Claire, Wisconsin. (161A. C. Weed, 11. Letter lo Ihe edilors. Foreign Policy, NO 8, Fall 1972: 161-3. (17)David Holden. Allende and ¡he Myth Makers, Encounler, V.42, January 1974: Holden is Ct)ief Foreign Correspondenl lor Ihe London Sunday Times. 125

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