Chile: the balanced view : a recopilation of articles about the Allende years and after

The Chilean government spoke out vigorously at several international meetings to protest what it perceived to be gross discrimination against Chile by the international financial community, and an attempt by the United States "to transform a multilateral agency into an instrument of bilateral policy aimed agailist another nation."(1) Chilean President Allende told the U.N. General Assembly in 1972 that, along with others, the multilateral banks were exercising a financial embargo against his country and that, whereas Chile had received about $80 million annually from the banks before he assumed pffice, thereafter new credits from those institutions dried up completely.(2) At the 1972 annual meeting of the World Bank and IMF, Chilean Central Bank President Alfonso Inostroza said that the World Bank was acting in a "maniféstly precipitate and prejudiced manner... not as an independent multinational body at the service of the economic deve– lopment of all its members, but in fact as a spokesman or instrument of private interests of one of its member countries."(3) He later included the 10B in his charge.(4) Chile's Ambassador Cubillos told the 1972 ECOSOC annual meeting that "it seems that the (World) Bank's loan policy has been revised and that the granting of credits today depends more on politicalideologythan onthe content ofprojects. "The Bankwas violating international law, several U.N. GeneraI.Assembly'resolutions, and all principies of legal logic and moral judgement. he argued, when it used the Chilean nationalization of foreign firms as a pretext for not lending to Chile. He voiced his regret that "the sabotage of the Chilean economy by foreign monopolies coincided with the refusal ofthe Bank to grant the financial aid which was vitally needed by Chile at a decisive'turning-point in its history.(5) At the 1972 annual meeting of the 10B, Chilean Finance Minister Américo Zorrilla denoun– ced the slowness ofthe Bank in responding to Chilean loan applications and what he saw as U.S. efforts to make the 10B an instrument at the service ofthe interests it represents. IOB delays were attributable to the Bank's hidden intent of refusing or postponing loans to Chile because of its domestic policies and interests of U.S. policy, he charged. In effect, he charged, Chile was being punished for its domestic policies and for its expropriation of U.S-owned firms, a situatioñ which violated the principies, independence and integrity upon which the international institution was presumably founded.(6) To varying degrees, these charges of politicized bank I.ending operations have been supported by several analysts who have studied the Chilean situation. Federico G. Gil! suggests that there may be some validity to the Chilean allegations, given the sharp termination of bank lending and the heavy U.S. voting influence in the institutions.(7) Paul Sigmund states that "It appears almost certain that U.S. influence was exercised to delay the submission of Chilean projects to the 10B Bank board ... "(8) James Petras and Robert La Porte are more far-reaching in their indictment. "It is clear from the record, ': they sayo "that the 'international' lending agencies are mere appendages of .the U.S. government."(9) Controlled by the U.S. Treasury Oepartment, the multilateral banks were used by the United States Government to further its anti-Chilean policies, they argue.{1 O) The U.S. Government tried to cut Chilean lines of credit in arder to collapse or tame that foreign government. (1}lnter-American Development Bank. Proceedings, Thirleenth Meeting 01 the Board 01 Governors. May 1972. Remarks 01 Mr. Américo Zorrilla 01 Chile, p. 98. (2}Speech delivered by Dr. Salvador A"ende, President 01 the Republic 01 Chile, before the General Assembly 01 the United Nations. December 4.1972. Washington, D.C. Embassy 01 Chile, pp. 13-17. (3}Ouoted in the Washington Post and New York Times, September 29, 1972. (4)Press conlerence remarks, quoted in Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1972. (5}United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Official Records, Resumed Fifty-third Sessions. lROctober, 1972, pp. 14-16. (6)IOB, Proceedings, Thirleenth Meeting, pp. 94-100. (7)Federico G. Gil!. Socialist Chile and the United States. Imer-American Economic Affairs. Vol. 27, Automn. 1973:43. (8)Paul Sigmund. The "Invisible Blockade" and the Uverlhrow 01 Allende. Foreign Affáirs, Vol. 52. January 1974: 327. (9)James Petras and Roberl LaPorle. Chile: NO. Foreign Policy, number 7, Summer 1972: 149. (10)lbid., p. 143. 124